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This dissertation focuses on robust coalition formation between selfish agents in a 
dynamic environment where contracts are unenforceable. Previous research on this topic 
has covered each different aspect of this problem, but no research successfully addresses 
these factors in combination. Therefore, a novel approach is required. This dissertation 
accordingly has three major goals: to develop a theoretical framework that describes how 
selfish agents should select jobs and partners in a dynamic, contractless environment, to 
test a strategy based on that framework against existing heuristics in a simulated 
environment, and to create a learning agent capable of optimally adjusting its coalition 
formation strategy based on the level of dynamic change found in its environment. 
Experimental results demonstrate that the Expected Utility (EU) strategy based on the 
developed theoretical framework performs better than strategies using heuristics to select 
jobs and partners, and strategies which simulate a centralized “manager”. Future work in 
this area includes altering the EU strategy from an anytime strategy to a hill-climbing 















































Agents are rational, autonomous pieces of software that act on and interact with 
environments, humans, and other agents (Wooldridge and Jennings 1995). Multi-agent 
systems, where agents interact with other agents, are a particularly interesting field of 
study which has already been utilized in domains as diverse as network routing (White 
and Pagurek 1998), undersea exploration (Sarne and Kraus 2005)  and collaboratively 
playing board games (Johansson 2006).  
In a multi-agent system, agents must often form teams to solve certain complex tasks, 
either because it is more efficient to do so, or because no one agent possesses the skills 
necessary to completely finish a task on its own. This process of team formation is often 
complicated by several factors. For example, many agents are fully independent, and act 
only according to their perceived best interests. In a contractless environment such as the 
Internet these agents cannot be coerced, but rather must be compelled into joining teams. 
Furthermore, agent teams frequently operate in dynamic environments, where the tasks 
that agents work on suddenly and unpredictably change over time. However, such 
changes may cause existing agent teams to fracture, as agents on the team either leave for 
new opportunities or leave because they have less work to do on a job, and therefore less 
incentive to stay on. 
Agents may therefore seek to form robust teams capable of pursuing their objectives 
in the face of both external changes, such as changes to problem requirements, and 
internal changes, which may include defections and failures within the team. However, 
although existing research in the field individually addresses the topics of selfish agents, 
dynamic environments and contractless environments, no research currently addresses all 
three topics in combination. For example, although algorithms exist that are capable of 
efficiently partitioning selfish agents into teams assigned to given jobs in a static 
environment (Kraus, Shehory et al. 2003), such algorithms are inadequate to address the 
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exponential number of potential job permutations in a dynamic environment. Likewise, 
although mechanisms exist for allowing teams to adapt to dynamic job requirements 
(Scerri, Farinelli et al. 2005), such teams are composed of selfless agents, and are not 
applicable to selfish agents which may not accept a loss of utility as tasks change. 
Finally, although contracting mechanisms exist that are capable of allowing selfish agents 
to deal with uncertain information or dynamic environments (Sandholm and Lesser 
1996), such mechanisms are clearly not applicable to domains such as the Internet where 
contracts cannot be enforced.  
Furthermore, the concept of selfish individuals operating in dynamic, contractless 
environments extends beyond purely agent-based systems to hybrid human/agent 
systems, and even to domains based entirely in human interaction. For example, freelance 
consultants and small teams within large consultant firms may have a certain degree of 
autonomy in setting priorities on what projects they work on and who they work with. 
Coalitions of freelance consultants possessing different skills and resources may join to 
solve complex problems, but these coalition members often act as peers, having no clear 
lines of authority between them. Accordingly, no penalties exist to dissuade a coalition 
member from dropping out or penalties may be less than rewards offer by other teams. 
Furthermore, the work requirements of a complex project may shift over time, either 
because of misunderstandings, communication failures, or inherent environmental 
dynamics. A comprehensive theory that addresses coalition formation between selfish 
agents in contractless, dynamic environments could therefore significantly boost 
productivity and utility in business environments by giving coalition members guidance 
on what projects to pursue and what teams to partner with. Similar potential exists in 
domains such as freelancers collaborating via the Internet, and autonomous drones in a 
distributed computing environment. 
This dissertation will therefore address the following question: how do independent 
agents form robust teams to solve problems in dynamic, contractless environments? More 
specifically, how do agents maximize their utility – defined here as reward earned by 
successfully completing problems (or “jobs”) – in dynamic, contractless environments 
through job and partner selection? Research to investigate this question follows:  
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1. Define an agent’s utility within a team based on the agent’s job and 
partner selection decisions in the context of conditions encountered in a 
dynamic, contractless environment. 
2. Derive a strategy that maximizes the agent’s utility in a dynamic, 
contractless environment. 
3. Test and refine the developed strategy in a large-scale agent simulation 
across a wide variety of settings and parameters. 
4. Create a learning agent capable of adjusting its team formation 
strategies according to prevailing environmental conditions. 
5. Adapt the simulation and strategies to better simulate a real-world 




This dissertation posits that, in a contractless, dynamic environment, peer groups of 
autonomous agents can form high-utility teams by determining how to balance used and 
unused skills that agents bring to a team. More specifically, the immediate incentive for 
an agent to join with and stay on a team, represented by the skills that an agent is 
currently utilizing, must be balanced against the adaptive capability that an agent brings 
to a team, represented by the skills an agent is currently not utilizing, but which might be 




This research will examine the following hypothesis:  
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In a contractless, dynamic environment, peer groups of autonomous 
agents can form robust, high-utility teams that balance skill set 
adaptability and redundancy with individual agent incentive. 
 
More specifically, this dissertation is based on the premise that agent teams in a 
dynamic environment must have robust skill sets to handle changes in job requirements, 
agent defections and agent failures. However, in a contractless environment, individual 
agents must be provided enough incentive to join and stay with a team, even if each 




What combination of job and team selection heuristics optimizes an agent’s utility in 
a dynamic, contractless environment? This question will examine how various job and 
team selection heuristics, each representing a different intuitive approach to operating in 
a dynamic, contractless environment, influence agent utility. For example, is it better for 
agents to try to build teams that have redundant skill sets, and can therefore tolerate team 
member defections, or is it better for agents to try to build teams that have auxiliary skill 
sets, and can therefore handle the sudden addition of new job requirements? Furthermore, 
are different heuristics preferable in environments with different levels of dynamicism? 
 
1.1.2 Research Question 2 
How is an agent’s utility in a dynamic, contractless environment defined in terms of 
job and partner selection? This question seeks a utility theory that will theoretically 
quantify the relationship between an agent’s job and partner selections and the agent’s 
utility, thereby exploring beyond the experimental heuristic comparisons examined by 
RQ1. More specifically, while previous heuristics focused on individual concerns such as 
making teams adaptive, or redundant, or balancing team robustness with agent incentives, 
no heuristic examined how all the concerns addressed by RQ1 heuristics jointly interact 
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to influence agent utility. Accordingly, the utility theory provided by answering this 
question will address both why agents join and stay with a team, and what capabilities 
agents should bring to a team in a dynamic, contractless environment. 
 
1.1.3 Research Question 3 
How do agents acting in accordance with the utility theory found in RQ2 perform in 
contractless, dynamic environments? This question seeks to examine how successful 
agents acting according to a strategy derived from the theory developed in RQ2 will be in 
dynamic, contractless environments. More specifically, how does such a strategy perform 
across a range of dynamic environments, and how does the performance of the control 
strategy compare to the heuristics from RQ1? 
 
1.1.4 Research Question 4 
Can a learning agent adapt its job and partner selections to improve its utility based 
on observed environmental dynamics? More specifically, this question will address how 
observed job dynamics, rates of partner defection, and other factors allow an agent to 
adjust its selection of jobs and partners in real time. Note that while RQ3 focuses on 
utilizing the theory found in RQ2 to select jobs and partners, RQ4 will be more focused 
on experimentally determining optimal linkages between observed changes in 
environment and expressed changes in agent behavior. 
 
1.1.5 Research Question 5 
Can agents acting in accordance with the utility theory found in RQ2 be usefully 
deployed in a real world-based consulting domain? This question examines how the 
strategy tested in RQ3 performs when simulation parameters are adapted to more closely 
mirror real-world domain factors, and how the strategy from RQ2 compares in 





This work will bridge the gap between several areas of agent research by providing a 
theoretical description of selfish agent utility in dynamic, contractless environments. As 
discussed in further detail in Chapter 2, although a significant amount of research has 
examined the coalition teaming – some consisting of selfish agents, or encountering 
dynamic environments or operating in contractless environments, no research has 
examined all factors in combinations including selfish agents operating in dynamic and 
contractless environments. By providing a theory that addresses all three concepts 
simultaneously, new comparisons and explorations of previously distinct agent domains 
may be achieved. More specifically, this research provides a formal definition of the 
potential payoffs for selecting partners and attempting to complete multi-task jobs in a 
dynamic, contractless environment. This formal definition is used to derive an Expected 
Utility (EU) strategy that is then experimentally shown to provide superior performance 
to existing heuristic-based strategies in a variety of environments. The EU strategy is also 
compared to “ideal” strategies which do not operate under EU’s constraints (i.e., dynamic 
job requirements and contractless interactions with other agents). In comparison to these 
ideal strategies, the EU strategy is generally found to earn within one order of magnitude 
as much credit, thereby suggesting that the EU strategy is able to deal with dynamic, 
contractless environments by building robust teams of agents. Finally, the EU strategy is 
shown to provide superior performance to a centralized “manager” strategy in an 
experimental domain that closely approximates a real-world consulting domain. 
Furthermore, in addition to team formation between agents operating in consulting 
domains, this research may also be utilized in emerging open problem-solving markets, 
such as Yahoo! Answers. These collaborative problem-solving domains are currently 
hampered by the threat of unreliable partners and uncertain problem requirements and 
information. However, by allowing software agents or humans connected only by the 
Internet to select the best problems to work on and partners to work with, the resulting 
utility of collaborative problem-solving can be greatly improved, even in the face of 
partner defections and changing or inaccurate problem requirements.  
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Finally, this work is both complementary and supplementary to existing trust and 
reputation mechanisms. More specifically, the EU strategy can be used to select partners 
to work with when no detailed trust and reputation information is available about 
potential partners – the EU strategy requires only a single estimate for the average 
reliability of all partners. This estimate can be provided through previous experience with 
a given domain, a worst-case boundary on the expected reliability of potential partners, or 
even gut instinct on the part of a human user. Accordingly, the EU strategy is 
supplemental to trust and reputation strategies in that it can be used during a 
bootstrapping phase when detailed information on specific potential partners is still being 
gathered, and complementary to trust and reputation strategies in that it can be used when 





 Coalition formation and negotiation between agents has long been studied in many 
different contexts, from largely theoretical work rooted in game theory (Davis and 
Maschler 1963), to protocols describing how computer systems can subcontract tasks to 
each other (Smith 1980), to recent work on efficiently determining how a group of 
multiple agents can best be partitioned to solve multiple unique tasks (Rahwan, 
Ramchurn et al. 2007). This chapter will focus on describing previous work on those 
aspects of coalition formation relevant to the idea of robust coalition formation between 
agents in dynamic, contract-free environments. More particularly, section 2.1 will discuss 
and contrast coalition formation between both selfish and selfless agents, while section 
2.2 will discuss how coalitions of agents function in dynamic or unpredictable 
environments. Section 2.3 will focus on enforcement mechanisms for contracts between 
agents, as well how agents operate in environments that have no such mechanisms. 
Finally, section 2.4 will present a justification for robust coalition formation between 




A significant amount of work has been done on coalition formation between agents, 
both selfish and selfless, in static environments. Because the environments are static, the 
question of contracts does not arise – merely determining the valuation of all possible 
actions is usually sufficient for agents, be they selfish or selfless, to plot out a course of 
action that all parties will adhere to. Accordingly, all the work discussed in this section 
deals with static environments, unless explicitly stated otherwise. 
Many of the earliest and most important explorations of coalition formation between 
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autonomous entities predate the digital revolution and software agents. Specifically, 
mathematics researchers studying game theory contributed several key ideas to the study 
of coalitional games – that is, games between independent, welfare maximizing entities 
attempting to form groups and negotiate the division of a reward (e.g. a cash payoff) 
generated by the group’s joint effort. The complexity of coalitional games is such that 
even a small number of players can generate a large number of potential outcomes. 
Accordingly, studies into coalitional games have focused less on finding single optimal 
outcomes or solutions, and more on defining feasible outcomes that might conceivably be 
reached by rational players. 
 For example the concept of the Core defines one or more outcomes to a coalition 
game where no coalition in a given partition (that is, a given division of multiple players 
into one or more coalitions) can improve its outcome by changing coalition membership 
or division of payoffs (Myerson 1991). Other key concepts in this area include Davis and 
Maschler’s introduction of the Kernel, which defines a set of outcomes where every 
member of a given coalition has an equivalent amount to gain (or lose) by leaving (Davis 
and Maschler 1963), and the Shapley value, which defines the payoff to any individual 
member of a coalition as that member’s expected marginal contribution to the coalition’s 
overall value (Shapley 1997). 
Further research has continued in this area, often focusing on different variations or 
extensions to the basic coalitional game. For example, Lesser and Sandholm have 
examined coalitions between computationally bounded agents, wherein agents lack 
sufficient computational power or time to fully consider all the potential ramifications of 
forming a specific coalition. Interestingly, they find that even in superadditive 
environments – that is, situations where adding more members to a coalition always 
increases the coalition’s utility – rationally bounded agents may not choose to join larger 
coalitions (Sandholm and Lesser 1997). Alternatively, Shehory and Krauss have 
examined task selection in tandem with coalition formation (Shehory and Kraus 1998) 
and coalition formation mechanisms between agents in non-superadditive environments 
(Shehory and Kraus 1999).  
More recently, significant work has taken place in developing algorithms to 
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efficiently search through the space of potential partitions for optimal coalitional values. 
Sandholm et al. have developed a mechanism to conduct a bounded search through the 
space of coalition structures (i.e. partitions) such that by searching through a given subset 
of the set of possible partitions, a maximum bound can be placed on the value of the best 
possible partition (Sandholm, Larson et al. 1999). Additional work by several authors 
(Rahwan, Ramchurn et al. 2007; Su, Hu et al. 2007) has extended this research to a point 
where bounded, anytime search through the partition space is possible. Specifically, it is 
now possible to bound the desired optimality of results (i.e. the degree to which the 
returned result approaches the optimal result) and accordingly search a decreased amount 
of search space, or to conduct search so that it can be stopped at any time, with the 
quality of the returned result increasing monotonically the longer the search is allowed to 
execute (Rahwan, Ramchurn et al. 2007). Still further research has been conducted in the 
area of coalition structure exploration utilizing genetic algorithms (Sen and Dutta 2000) 
or hierarchical decomposition search of the coalition space (Abdallah and Lesser 2004). 
It is noted that these last two pieces of work, in contrast to those before and after, utilizes 
selfless agents who seek primarily to increase their team’s utility, as opposed to selfish 
agents, who seek primarily to increase their own utility. 
Turning towards more technical aspects of coalition formation between software 
agents, we find Smith’s seminal work on the Contract Net protocol, which provides a 
mechanism for agents to sub-contract tasks between each other, thereby allowing for the 
efficient division of work between two or more agents (Smith 1980). Additional work in 
contracting between agents has further extended this basic concept of contracting 
between agents. For example, Sandholm’s work on OSCM contracts provides a 
mechanism wherein agents can subcontract tasks out singularly or in clusters, swap tasks 
between each other and engage in complex transactions concerning three or more agents 
(Sandholm 1998). 
However, while such work provides the technical capability for software agents to 
coordinate on working on complex tasks, they do not provide guidance as to why such 
mechanisms would be preferable to top-down control, or address the question of what 
subcontracting it would be advantageous for an agent to engage in. Towards these ends, 
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Wellman and Wurman notably provided a justification for the utility of market-based 
behavior in providing an effective allocation of resources in a distributed manner 
(Wellman 1997), while Kraus, Shehory, and others have produced numerous papers on 
auction mechanisms wherein complex tasks are bid on by various agent coalitions 
(Kraus, Shehory et al. 2003; Kraus, Shehory et al. 2004; Manisterski, David et al. 2006). 
These auction mechanisms are capable of handling a wide variety of environments, 
including limited information, bounded rationality, and both selfish and unselfish agents.  
Alternatively, other work that examines individual agent decisions in coalition 
formation examines how agents behave when connected to other agents via social 
networks. More particularly, Skyrms and Permantle provided research showing that 
social networks invariably arise between agents equipped with reinforcement learning 
when playing certain games (Skyrms and Pemantle 2004). Following along these lines, 
Gaston and others have done interesting work on how agents adapt social structures and 
form coalitions within their existing social structures (Gaston 2005) and how different 
types of social network structures influence coalition formation (Gaston, Simmons et al. 
2004). Alternatively, Weerdt et al. have developed a mechanism for how agents in a 
social network can efficiently distribute incoming tasks to their neighbors (de Weerdt, 
Zhang et al. 2007). Work has also been done on overlapping coalitions, where agents 
with rare or valuable skills can be part of more than one coalition at once (Wilson and 
DesJardins 2007), or where multi-skilled agents may simultaneously provide different 
skills to different coalitions (Lin and Hu 2007). 
Still other work in coalition formation has focused on very large scale environments, 
where hundreds, thousands, or even greater numbers of agents exist in a decentralized 
environment. Lerman and others have allowed agents in a large scale environment to 
balance exploration and exploitation of existing coalitions via a physics-based coalition 
formation mechanism (Lerman and Shehory 2000; Lerman and Galstyan 2003), while 
Tosic and Agha have presented an algorithm for bottom-up team generation based on 
graph structure and cliques of agents (Tosic and Agha 2005), and Sander et al. have 
described a mechanism for agents to efficiently distribute themselves around existing 
tasks in a two-dimensional environment (Sander, Peleschuk et al. 2002). Additionally, 
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White and Pagurek have covered the utility of ant-like “swarm” behavior of thousands of 
agents in adapting to dynamic optimization problems (White and Pagurek 1998). It is, of 
course, noted that work in all these fields is ongoing, since no one algorithm is likely to 
produce the perfect answer for any and all situations. 
 
2.2 Coalitions in dynamic environments 
Although coalition formation between agents in a fixed, static environment is difficult 
enough, a significant amount of research has focused on the formation and operation of 
coalitions in dynamic environments, where the coalitions must either change their actions 
or their memberships in response to external stimuli. The wide breadth of such research is 
not surprising when we consider how broad the concept of a “dynamic environment” 
actually is: the introduction of new tasks, the modification of existing tasks, changing 
relationships between agents, environmental uncertainty, bounded rationality or any 
combination thereof may require entirely new forms of coalition formation and operating, 
some of which we examine below. It is noted that all the work in this section deals with 
dynamic environments, either with selfish agents acting under enforceable contracts, or 
selfless agents acting without contracts. 
One of the most prominent and easy-to-understand examples of a dynamic 
environment is the RoboCup rescue simulator, which simulates an ongoing, city-wide 
disaster and challenges cooperative teams of selfless agents to respond as effectively as 
possible (Kitano, Tadokoro et al. 1999). More specifically, the RoboCup Rescue domain 
is loosely based on the 1995 Kobe, Japan earthquake, and features multiple cooperative 
software agents assigned into various emergency response roles such as firefighters, 
police, and EMTs. These agents must rescue trapped civilians, minimize the amount of 
damage done by spreading fires, and clear blocked roads to allow better access to fires 
and civilians, all in a coordinated manner. The environment is dynamic in multiple ways: 
fires spread if not promptly extinguished, new fires pop up, and information is not 
perfect, meaning that agents’ view of the situation, and therefore their response to it, 
changes with time. Programming teams from various academic institutions compete 
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against each other to develop the most effective teams, and have developed a very wide 
variety of solution implementations, from centrally coordinated systems which rely on 
prioritized rules to select tasks (Nazemi, Faradad et al. 2005) to centralized auctions and 
decentralized, low overhead communication mechanisms (Nair, Ito et al. 2001), to novel 
coordination mechanisms adapted from the RoboCup soccer domain (Lau, Reis et al. 
2005). 
At least some of the solutions found through the RoboCup Rescue domain have 
inspired other, more general mechanisms for adapting to dynamic circumstances. For 
example, Tambe et al. have produced several papers focusing on the STEAM framework, 
which allows for a team of agents to reassign roles based on environmental events 
(Tambe, Pynadath et al. 2000). For example, in one domain, cooperative software agents 
are assigned to simulated helicopters, and as a team, are assigned to transport valuable 
cargo over dangerous territory. Helicopters can be utilized either to transport cargo or to 
scout the territory, ensuring that no hazards are ahead, and removing hazards as they are 
perceived. STEAM manages how agents move back and forth between the scout and 
transport roles over the course of the mission as the situation on the ground changes 
(Nair, Tambe et al. 2003). STEAM has also been further adapted to focus on team 
persistence, so that changes to agent roles within a team can be considered in light of how 
reallocation may effect the team’s long-term viability (Tambe and Zhang 1998). 
Researchers have also done work on dynamically adapting the control of a coalition 
of agents in response to the current environment and changes to that environment. For 
example, Corkill and Lesser described a mechanism wherein cooperative agents in a 
distributed network determined how to best balance immediate domain-specific operating 
with handling broader network issues, such as routing messages between agents (Corkill 
and Lesser 1983). Alternatively, Martin demonstrated an Adaptive Decision Making 
Framework which allowed a multi-agent system to decide, based on varying criteria, 
whether agents would be better off working in a command-and-control structure, in a 
fully-cooperative peer-to-peer fashion, or completely independently from one another 
(Martin 2001). 
As previously mentioned during the earlier discussion of RoboCup Rescue, even 
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when an environment is not specifically dynamic, uncertain or newly available 
information may still cause agents to adapt their current course of action, or specifically 
act with the understanding that the information being received is not complete or fully 
accurate. Accordingly, past research into software agents has focused on dealing with 
coalition formation and negotiation under uncertainly. For example, Hanna and 
Mouaddib have described mechanisms which allow selfish agents in an auction setting to 
rationally bid on tasks in an auction setting, despite only having probabilistic information 
on what the resource cost of completing those tasks will be (Hanna and Mouaddib 2002). 
Alternatively, Chalkiadadis and Boutilier have extended the concept of the Core, 
described above, by combining it with Bayesian learning for situations where selfish 
agents are not entirely certain about the capabilities of other agents. Under their 
mechanism, agents may join or leave coalitions based not only on expected rewards, but 
based on how exploring new coalitions can help improve an agent’s information about 
potential coalition members (Chalkiadakis and Boutilier 2004). Similarly, Yokoo et al 
have proposed a framework for coalition formation between agents in an open, 
anonymous environment, wherein selfish agents have the capacity to project false 
identities, yet still must form working coalitions (Yokoo, Conitzer et al. 2005). 
Other notable work involving agents with uncertain information has been produced 
by Ketchpel, which examined the difficulty and complexity of negotiations between 
selfish agents with different conceptions of a task or item’s value (Ketchpel 1994), and 
the work of Kraus et al. on negotiation between agents with limited negotiation 
timeframes (Kraus, Wilkenfeld et al. 1995). Scully et al have produced work on coalition 
value calculation in environments where the metrics of value may change over time 
(Scully, Madden et al. 2004). Finally, Soh and Tsatsoulis have presented the concept of 
“hastily formed” coalitions, which allow coalitions of selfish agents to quickly form to 
solve a task’s minimum requirements in environments where bounded rationality or 





Beyond the issues of coalition formation in dynamic environments, there are issues of 
enforcing coalition behavior in such environments. More specifically, it is fairly trivial to 
manage coalitions formed by perfectly cooperative agents – determining how agents 
should optimally act in such coalitions may be perfect, but cooperative agents will not try 
to cheat or break away from an assembled coalition. However, semi- or non-cooperative 
agents in any environment that is not perfectly static, with perfect information and total 
rationality, always have the potential to cheat, break from coalitions, or otherwise take 
actions contrary to their agreed-upon roles. Consequently, enforcement mechanisms for 
coalitions are also a fruitful area of research. Accordingly, this section discusses selfish 
agents acting in dynamic environments, unless explicitly stated otherwise. 
One of the simplest ways to deal with exceptions occurring in agent behavior is to 
simply craft agreements between selfish agents that take such exceptions into 
consideration. For example, Raiffa broadly discusses the possibilities of contingency 
contracts, wherein payouts between agents are altered, or occur only when certain 
preconditions are met (Raiffa 1982). Faratin and Klein further delve into the potential of 
contingency contracts by offering a taxonomy of exceptions and describing a mechanism 
for dealing with exceptions, by taking the potential of service failure into account during 
subcontracting negotiations between agents (Faratin and Klein 2001). 
However, contingency contracts face certain unavoidable limitations in practice. In all 
but the simplest domains, the list of examined contingencies cannot possibly be fully 
examined, meaning that the number of exceptions that such contracts can realistically 
deal with must be relatively small. Furthermore, the specific exceptions considered in 
contingency contracting are unavoidably domain-specific, meaning that few, if any, 
domain-independent theoretical principles can be drawn from studying them.  
Alternatively, the concept of leveled commitment contracts avoids many of these 
pitfalls. Sandholm and Lesser were the first to suggest a leveled commitment protocol 
between agents, wherein selfish agents had the option to decommit, or opt out of an 
existing contract, simply by paying a predefined penalty. They further proved that such 
an arrangement could frequently lead to superior outcomes in comparison to absolute 
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contracts without the ability to exit (Sandholm and Lesser 1996). Note that leveled 
commitment contracts differ from contingency contracts in that these contracts are not 
designed with specific contingencies in mind. Rather, agents are free to decommit at any 
time upon determining that it is advantageous for them to do so. Sandholm has continued 
to do extensive research on leveled commitment contracts, examining the effect of 
contract prices and decommit prices (Andersson and Sandholm 2001), proving the 
existence of Nash equilibria for leveled contracts and providing algorithms to locate those 
equilibria (Sandholm, Sikka et al. 1999), and examining the effect of various protocols 
(e.g. simultaneous versus sequential decommitment) on the utility of leveled commitment 
contracts (Sandholm and Zhou 2002). 
Of course, both contingency and leveled commitment contracts implicitly rest on the 
assumption that contracts between agents are enforceable, or that agents have reason to 
follow contracts even when carrying them out would lead to short-term loss of utility. 
Lesser and Sandholm examined unenforced contracts and broadly determined that 
unenforced contracts between agents are only possible when selfish agents’ long-term 
utility for following a contract is greater than their short-term utility for breaking it. In a 
single discrete exchange of goods and/or services, this can only occur when agents have 
already accrued all related expenses prior to the actual exchange, but in a continuous 
exchange (e.g. a stream of information for a stream of money), or in a series of discrete 
exchanges, trades can be structured so that each party in the exchange has an incentive to 
stay within the contract (Sandholm and Lesser 1995). These results are confirmed by 
other researchers, such as Saha et al, who show that associating with other agents based 
on past history and known expertise can lead to increased utility and stability (Saha, Sen 
et al. 2003), and Rathod and DesJardins who find superior utility for agents in stable 
teams versus agents in “on-demand” teams, which assemble and disassemble as needed 
(Rathod and DesJardins 2004). The long term stability of agent coalitions and 
communities is also of key interest to the agent trust community, a broad overview of 
which is provided by Fullam (Fullam 2007). 
In addition to contracting mechanisms, researchers have also studied the use of fault-
tolerant mechanisms in agent coalitions. For example, beyond the “timeout” mechanism 
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originally proposed by Smith in the Contract Net framework (Smith 1980), Klein and 
Dellarocas proposed a set of domain-independent enforcement agents dedicated to 
monitoring the progress and compliance of selfish agents performing domain-specific 
tasks (Dellarocas and Klein 2000). Patel et al proposed a similar mechanism of agents in 
a virtual organization coordinating computational grid-based activities, carrying out roles 
such as “policemen”, quality assurance agents, and reputation brokers (Patel, Teacy et al. 
2005). Guessoum et al also described a system for replicating agents as needed for fault-
tolerance in massive-scaled systems, based on criteria such as service criticality, number 
of existing agents and resource availability (Guessoum, Briot et al. 2005). 
 
2.4 Robust coalition formation in dynamic, contract‐free environments 
Surprisingly, despite the large amount of research done on coalition formation 
between software agents, arguably no research has touched on the exact mix of robust 
coalition formation between selfish agents in a dynamic, contract-free environment. For 
example, Scerri et al have provided work on “Extreme Teams”, which are large-scale 
teams of cooperative agents tasked to work on a large, dynamic set of tasks (Scerri, 
Farinelli et al. 2005). However, the protocol proposed for Extreme Team coordination is 
a low-communication overhead distributed constraint optimization protocol, and as such 
does not address issues such as non-cooperative agents, agent motivation, or 
reconfiguring task assignments to deal with dropped or newly added subtasks. 
Similarly, Klusch and Gerber have introduced a simulation-based scheme for 
evaluating and developing potential coalitions of selfish agents in a dynamic environment 
(Klusch and Gerber 2002). Such work only offers an opportunity for coalition 
membership to be modified during the negotiation and calculation valuation process; 
contracts between agents are binding once entered into, and existing coalitions have no 
mechanism to adapt their behavior according to external or internal changes. Lin et al 
also offer a restructuring algorithm for coalition formation capable of dealing with the 
arrival of new agents during the team formation process (Lin, Hu et al. 2007), but again, 
coalition agreements are binding and no provision is offered for how teams should deal 
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with change once coalitions are formed. 
Accordingly this gap in the research suggests a need for robust coalition formation 
between selfish agents in dynamic, contract-free environments. However, it should be 
noted that the work presented below owes a great deal to several of the broad concepts 
described above, particularly Tambe’s work on adaptive teams, Sandholm’s work on 
contracting issues, and many of the broad approaches used to deal with bounded 






To best understand the domain of selfish agents in dynamic, contractless 
environments, it is helpful to examine the problem from many different angles. Towards 
that end, section 3.1 of this chapter features a qualitative examination of a simple 
theoretical model which illustrates many issues related to the domain, such as the 
computational complexity of dynamic environments and the balance between team size 
and team adaptability. Section 3.2 approaches the domain through a more quantitative 
perspective by modeling the problem environment through mathematical descriptions of 
agents, jobs, tasks and skills.  Section 3.3 describes an agent simulation based on the 
models from section 3.2, applicable to multiple research questions. Section 3.4 describes 
the approach to research question 1, and section 3.5 provides the results of simulated 
experiments comparing the performance of various heuristic-based strategies. 
  
3.1 Qualitative Approach 
We begin by considering a set of agents and a set of jobs, illustrated in Figure 1 
below. Agents are selfish, concerned only with maximizing their own rewards. Jobs are 
composed of multiple independent subtasks, each of which must be completed before the 
job is completed. These subtasks all fall into a set of different types, such that each 
different type of subtask requires a specific agent skill to be completed. Accordingly, 
each agent possesses skills that can be used to work on a specific type of subtask. For 
example, as shown in Figure 1, the first and second agents all possess a skill of type 1, 




Figure 1: Agents, skills, jobs and tasks 
  
Jobs are dynamic; meaning that as time moves forward job requirements may change. 
More specifically, Figure 2 shows an initial configuration of a given job, where two out 
of a possible six subtasks need to be completed in order for the job to be completed. 
However, in a dynamic environment, new subtasks may be added to the list of job 
requirements, and required subtasks may be dropped from the list of requirements. 
Accordingly, Figure 2 also shows two potential mutations of the job, the first where two 
additional subtasks have been added to the list of requirements, and the second where one 
subtask has been added and another has been dropped. 
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Figure 2: Job subtask dynamics 
 
Note also that the number of permutations that a job can undergo scales exponentially 
with the number of jobs and potential subtasks per job. To briefly sketch this proof, note 
that we can assign each potential subtask in Figure 2 a one or zero depending on if the 
subtask is currently required for job completion. Each potential state of the job can then 
be described as a 2N binary number, where N is the number of potential subtasks 
associated with the job. Thus, a single job with six subtasks has 64 possible permutations, 
and ten such jobs would have 2(10x6) total permutations, or roughly one quintillion (1018) 
possible states.  
Furthermore, if we allow for subtasks to have more than an active/inactive state – 
e.g., by demanding different quality-of-service for the subtask – then a single job has 
exponentially more permutations. For example, if each task can demand one of three 
different quality of service levels in addition to potentially being inactive, the number of 
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permutations for a job with six subtasks is 46, or 4096 possible states, and ten such jobs 
would be 4(10x6), or roughly 1036 possible states. 
In such an environment, a team that wishes to complete a job even as the job 
requirements change must clearly possess some potential for adaptation – just because a 
skill is not currently required to complete a job, does not mean it will not be required in 
the future. However, let us make the reasonable assumption that agents earn profit in 
rough proportion to the direct utilization of their skills when completing a job – that is, an 
agent who is able to use two of its skills to complete two subtasks in a job will earn more 
profit than an agent who only completes one subtask. Therefore, in a dynamic, 
contractless environment, it is also possible that agents that are currently part of a team 
may leave their team if some or all of their skills are no longer required, or if another job 
becomes available that makes better use of an agent’s available skills.  
 
Figure 3: Potential teams and task assignments 
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For example, consider the three potential teams shown in Figure 3. The skills 
collected in Team A are currently sufficient to complete the job shown on the right, since 
the job only requires subtasks 1 through 6 to be completed. However, if it becomes 
necessary to complete any of subtasks 7, 8, or 9, then Team A will not be able to 
complete the job, and may potentially be unable to earn any profit. 
Alternatively, Team B shows a team where only a small portion of the team’s overall 
skill set is committed to the job on the right – those skills listed in black. The skills listed 
in blue are skills that might be utilized in the event that new subtasks are required, or an 
existing agent is no longer able to complete its assigned subtask. For example, if the first 
agent working on task 1 was to fail or quit, the last agent (currently working on task 6) 
could take over (Tambe and Zhang 1998).  
However, also note that the opportunity for an agent to defect is greater with such an 
arrangement. Again, if we assume that agents earn profit in rough proportion to how 
many of their skills they are able to use, any of the six agents in Team B may find a better 
job to work on, where more than one of their available skills is applicable to the job. 
Therefore, even though Team B has a skill set capable of adapting to sudden changes, the 
team members have relatively little incentive to stay with the team. Were Team B to face 
sudden defections by multiple team members, it too could find itself lacking sufficient 
resources to complete the associated job. 
Finally, Team C represents a team that is more optimally balanced between adaptive 
capacity and agent incentive. As a whole, the team possesses sufficient capacity to handle 
the addition of subtasks 7, 8, or 9 to the job requirements list, and each member of the 
team is able to use two of its available skills to work on the job. As described by earlier 
research, while each agent might potentially be able to increase its profit by finding 
another job where it was able to use all three of its available skills, such a team would 
find itself in a position similar to Team A, unable to adapt to new job requirements (Jones 




We start our quantitative problem domain model with a set of general tasks T = {Ti}, 
where 1 ≤ i ≤ α. Each general task Ti represents a type of job that an agent might carry 
out: if T is limited to tasks involved in building construction, for example, T1 might be 
building a driveway, while T2 might be constructing a roof, and so on. Each general task 
Ti is therefore a set of task instances {Tij}, where each Tij is a specific instance of general 
task Ti associated with a job Jj, and where each job Jj is part of a set of jobs J = {Jj}, 
where 1 ≤ j ≤ β. For example, if T represents the set of all tasks associated with building a 
building, and if J is the set of all buildings under construction, then T11 might be building 
a driveway at a first building under construction, T12 might be building a driveway at a 
second building under construction, T21 is constructing a roof at the first building, and so 
on. Alternatively, as will be further described in Chapters 4 and 5, this model is also 
applicable to a knowledge-based consulting domain, where different tasks are different 
queries requiring skills in specialized domains. 
Each job Jj in set J contains a potential task instance Tij of every possible task Ti in T, 
but only a subset of these tasks needs to be completed to finish the job. Again, returning 
to the building example, every building in existence could conceivably have a swimming 
pool, or a loading dock, or a conference room, but in practice factories and offices rarely 
have swimming pools, and houses rarely have loading docks. Accordingly, within each 
job Jj, task instances Tij are separated into a set of active task instances ActiveTasksj, all of 
which must be completed for the job to be finished, and a set of inactive task instances 
InactiveTasksj, which are irrelevant to the job’s completion status. For any job Jj, 
ActiveTasksj ∪ InactiveTasksj  = {Tij} for all i, and ActiveTasksj ∩ InactiveTasksj = ∅.  
Continuing on, a set of skills S = {Si} and a set of self-interested agents A = {Ak} are 
introduced, where once again 1 ≤ i ≤ α and 1 ≤ k ≤ χ. Each skill Si is associated with a 
general task Ti, and may be used to work on and eventually complete any task instance Tij 
in Ti. Furthermore, each agent Ak has an associated set of skills AgentSkillsk that Ak is 
capable of doing, where AgentSkillsk is a subset of S.  
Agents use associated skills to complete tasks associated with various jobs, and earn 
credit by completing all active tasks in a given job. More specifically, each task instance 
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Tij has an associated TaskLengthij, where 1 ≤ TaskLengthij ≤ γ. To complete task instance 
Tij, an agent Ak must use an appropriate skill Si on the task instance for TaskLengthij 
timesteps. Accordingly, function C(Tij) is defined as a value ranging from 0 to 
TaskLengthij, and represents the amount of time that one or more agents have worked on 
Tij.  
To simulate the end results of uncertain information, bounded agent rationality and 
dynamic, unpredictable environments, jobs in J are dynamic and unpredictable. More 
particularly, task instances Tij in Jig are randomly moved between ActiveTasksi and 
InactiveTasksi on a periodic basis. This may be best understood as a sudden change to a 
job’s solution requirements. For example, despite the best efforts of project management 
and requirements engineering, software development projects frequently change their 
required functionality in the middle of development, either due to incorrect understanding 
of the end-user’s original demands or sudden changes demanded by the end user. 
Accordingly, during the course of such a project, some already-completed portions of the 
project may become obsolete and new modules may have to be built from scratch. 
Likewise, in the consulting domain explored below in Chapters 4 and 5, an initial 
decomposition of a client query may be inaccurate because of misunderstandings with the 
client, insufficient expertise on the part of the firm in analyzing a novel type of query, or 
simple environmental dynamics, where a changing external situation demands that 
different questions be answered. 
Figure 4 below summarizes the above environment by presenting an exemplary 
diagram of agents, skills, jobs and tasks. More specifically, the figure presents three 
agents, each with a random mix of four skills apiece (out of a total of five possible skills). 
Likewise, the figure presents two jobs, each with five potential subtasks. In the first job, 
the first, third, and fifth subtasks are active tasks, and thus must be completed to complete 
the job, whereas in the second job, only the first and fourth subtasks must be completed. 
The remaining subtasks are inactive and are thus represented as blocked-out. 
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Figure 4: Exemplary jobs and agents 
 
3.3 Simulation Operation 
The model described above in section 3.2 has been recreated in a software simulation, 
which may be used to test agent performance under different environmental conditions as 
the agent uses different strategies to form teams. Each agent Ak in the simulation has the 
same number of skills, and each skill in S equally common among agents in A. Similarly, 
different tasks are worth the same amount of credit, and agents earn rewards proportional 
to the TaskLengthij of any task instance Tij they finished. For example, an agent that 
completed a task over five timesteps earned five credit points, while an agent that 
completes a task over eight timesteps earned eight credit points. Such assumptions match 
domains such as collaboration between academic peers in the research community, where 
the rewards that accrue from completing a task are not monetary but are tied directly to 
increased respect among peers, or knowledge and skills gained from completing a 
specific task. It should be noted, however, that many domains will not share these same 
simulation parameters, and that the experimental simulator could easily be reconfigured 
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to have some agent skills be more or less common than others, or certain jobs or types of 
jobs be worth more than others. This will be demonstrated further in Chapters 4 and 5. 
Task instances Tij that are moved from InactiveTasksj to ActiveTasksj must be started 
anew, as if no previous work had been done on the now-active task, while only active 
task instances that have been fully completed are immune from being moved to 
InactiveTasksj. This decision was based on the reasoning that work that has been fully 
completed is often used in some way, somehow, whereas partially completed work is 
often abandoned entirely.  
The simulation environment is divided into discrete timesteps, or rounds. During each 
round, each agent in A may coordinate with other agents in A to form teams, or, if it is 
part of a team, may work on a task instance associated with a specific job in J. Each agent 
in A can belong to, at most, one team at a time, and each team works on only one job at a 
time. This is arguably a simplistic assumption, since real world providers of valuable 
skills or expertise frequently multitask between different projects at the same time. 
However, many problem solutions require complete focus from the workers involved, or 
security or other constraints may require exclusivity. Furthermore, requiring each agent 
to be part of only one team at a time allows us to clearly delineate where an agent is 
making a contribution. Determining to what degree an agent’s partial efforts (or lack 
thereof) require task reassignments touches on complex multidimensional trust issues 
(Gujral, DeAngelis et al. 2006), and is out of the scope for this dissertation work. 
During each round, an agent Ak may work on a job Jj by utilizing a skill Si found in 
AgentSkillsk to work on a task instance Tij found in set ActiveTasksj. Because timesteps 
are set up to emulate the smallest atomic unit of work that an agent can do with a given 
skill, each agent utilizes only one skill in any given round. After Ak has worked on Tij for 
the required number of rounds, Tij is completed.  
Credit is distributed to agents when a job Jj is completed, which, in turn, occurs when 
all task instances in ActiveTasksj are completed. Upon job completion, credit points for 
each active, completed task are given to the agent that completed the task. As described 
above, these credit points are proportional to the length of the completed task (e.g. a 
completed task of length five would give five credit points). No credit is given for work 
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on task instances that were moved to InactiveTasksj before completion, or to agents who 
worked on, but did not finish, a completed task instance. Accordingly, agents in the 
simulation may be said to work in a “pay-for-play” environment, where credit is 
distributed directly to those who have fully completed a given job. The lack of 
transferable utility between agents also highlights the impossibility of contingency 
contracting between agents, since agents receive no reward for being associated with a 
job other than the direct benefit they get from completing subtasks.  
Once a job Jig has been completed and paid out its credit, it is removed from J and a 
new Jj is created and inserted in J. Each new Jj starts with the same number of task 
instances randomly placed in ActiveTasksj, and task instance in the new job must be 
completed from scratch.  
As described above, the simulation incorporates unpredictability by shuffling task 
instances between ActiveTasksj and InactiveTasksj. More particularly, each round a given 
percentage of jobs in J are randomly shuffled. This percentage is referred to as the 
dynamicism of the simulation. Each task instance in each selected job Jj has a random 
chance of being selected for shuffling between ActiveTasksj and InactiveTasksj, such that, 
on average, one task instance per selected job is shuffled. However, as described above, 




Research question 1 states, “what combination of job and team selection heuristics 
optimizes an agent’s utility in a dynamic, contractless environment?” To answer this 
question, agents in the simulation described above have been divided into multiple 
classes, each of which executes a strategy consisting of a job selection heuristic and a 
team selection heuristic. The subsections below describe the communication and 





Agents operating in the simulation environment described above fulfill one of two 
roles at any given moment. In the first role, an agent takes a proactive “foreman” role and 
has the responsibility to select an available job to work on, the other agents the foreman 
will work with, and the specific subtasks that those partners will work on. The foreman 
communicates these selections to agents via proposal messages which are received by 
agents in a reactive “worker” role. These worker agents must then decide whether to 
accept the proposal offers sent out by a foreman agent, or whether to continue with the 
current job they are working on, if any.  
The opportunity to act as a foreman agent is randomly distributed among agents, such 
that in any given round of the simulation a given percentage of agents will have the 
opportunity to form teams. Obviously real-world agents in different domains may utilize 
vastly different criteria to determine when to take the initiative in finding problems and 
forming teams, including research in agent personality and attitude (Ahn, DeAngelis et 
al. 2007). Allowing agents to equally and randomly take the opportunity to become 
foremen is a necessary simplification to focus on the question of how teams should be 
formed, rather than when to form them.  
The foreman agent then utilizes one of several possible job- and team-selection 
strategies to determine what jobs to select, what partners to work with, and what subtask 
each partner should work on. Existing strategies are described further below in section 
3.4.2; improving these strategies by creating a comprehensive theory and using agent 
learning mechanisms is the heart of this dissertation. Accordingly, we remain focused for 
now on how agents interact with other agents, given the decisions produced by a given 
strategy. 
Once the foreman agent has used its associated team formation strategy to select a job 
Jw to work on and a potential team Teamx, the foreman claims Jw, thereby making it off 
limits to other teams, and sends proposal messages to potential partners in Teamx 
indicating the AssignedInstanceskw in Jw that a potential partner would work on. Note that, 
to encourage agents to form teams, |AgentSkillsk| is constant for all agents {Ak}, and the 
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initial value of |ActiveTasksj| > |AgentSkillsk| for all jobs {Jj}  requiring multiple agents to 
work together to solve any given job. 
When these proposal messages are received, each worker agent ranks the 
AssignedInstanceskw it is currently working on (if any) against one or more proposed 
AssignedInstanceskw using a job selection heuristic associated with that class of agent. If 
the worker agent finds that its current assigned tasks are preferable to any of the 
proposals, it continues working on its current job, and the foreman that sent the proposal 
takes the lack of a response as a decline message. If the agent receives a proposal it finds 
more attractive than its current job assignment, the agent returns an accept message to the 
foreman which sent the proposal.  
Accordingly, it is noted that agents may stop work on their current assignments at any 
time upon receiving a more attractive proposal (or, if they become a foreman agents, 
upon finding a more attractive job to work on). This obviously runs counter to a 
significant amount of work which his been done in contract negotiation and breaking 
contracts (Faratin and Klein 2001). However, such work usually involves complete 
information, and/or occurs between relatively small numbers of agents. In contrast, the 
scheme described here allows for agents which are better able to take advantage of new 
opportunities, and better simulates many environments where contracts are largely 
nonexistent or unenforceable (i.e. informal task forces and many Internet transactions). 
This lack of commitment between agents, combined with the dynamicism and 
unpredictability of jobs within the simulation, also makes it desirable for agents to 
assemble teams that can survive agent defections and changes in the task instances 
required to finish the job.  
If the foreman does not receive accept messages back from all potential partners, the 
team formation process has failed and the foreman, as well as the agents which accepted 
the team proposal, must wait for new team proposals or for their next chance to be a 
foreman. Alternatively, if agents have successfully formed Teamx, they begin to work on 
the task instances associated with Jw. Non-foreman agents may work on Jw until they have 
completed all task instances in AssignedInstanceskw. In contrast, the foreman agent must 
stay with Jw until the job is complete, even if the foreman has completed its assigned 
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tasks. Once all tasks have been completed, the simulation pays out credit to each agent 
according to the tasks they have completed. 
Agents work on all their assigned tasks in a simultaneous, round robin fashion. For 
example, if an agent is assigned to tasks one, three, and five, the agent will work on task 
one for one round, task three the next round, task five the following round, and task one 
in the fourth round, until all tasks are completed (or existing tasks are removed from the 
list of required tasks). It is believed that round-robin order gives a better approximation 
of real-world domains, where agents frequently multi-task their assigned work for a given 
problem. 
While Jw is incomplete, if a non-foreman agent defects from the job, or a new task 
instance is moved into ActiveTasksw set, the foreman is responsible for finding an agent to 
work on the new or abandoned task instance. The foreman may therefore assign the new 
task instance to the AssignedInstanceskw set of itself or a partner agent, in a manner 
similar to Tambe’s work on team reformation strategies (Tambe and Zhang 1998). 
Previous versions of the simulation have handled this case, wherein no team member has 
the skill required to handle the new task, in two different ways. In the first, the team 
simply fails and dissolves with the job uncompleted and no credit earned. In this 
situation, handling agent defections and the addition of new task requirements is clearly 
of paramount importance to the agents on a team – if these problems cannot be dealt 
with, agents will earn no profit.  
Alternatively, in other embodiments of the simulation, agent teams have the potential 
to recruit new members when no existing team members have the necessary skills, using 
a mechanism similar to the foreman proposals to form new teams described above. Under 
these rules, the effect of being unable to handle defections and new requirements is 
potentially less severe, and potentially closer to real-world problem domains, where 
additional reinforcements are often available. Both of these simulation modes will be 
utilized in this dissertation to test the relative utility of different heuristic-based strategies, 
as will be described in further detail below. Figures 5 and 6 below present flowcharts 




Figure 5: Operational flowchart of Foreman agent behavior 
 




Both worker and foreman agents must make decisions on what jobs to pursue and 
partners to work with, as described above. Agents in either role utilize paired job and 
team selection heuristics, described in further detail below, to compare and rank different 
jobs and potential teams (Jones and Barber 2007). For example, a Greedy job selection 
heuristic might rank the potential profitability of different jobs based on how much credit 
an agent could earn by completing assigned tasks in a job, while a Redundant team 
selection heuristic might rank the robustness of different teams by how many redundant 
skills each team has to be utilized in case an agent defects from a team. 
Agents utilize a mechanism for using both job and team heuristics simultaneously 
(Jones and Barber 2008). Agents acting in the foreman role initially look at all jobs in J 
that are not currently being worked on by another team. The foreman utilizes a job 
selection heuristic to select δ available, top-ranked jobs from J, thereby creating set P = 
{Jw}, where 1 ≤ w ≤ δ. For each Jw in P, each foreman agent then generates ε agent teams 
capable of solving Jw. More specifically, these agent teams each include the foreman 
agent which generated the team, and one or more other agents Ak, such that the combined 
skills of all the agents in the team are capable of completing the task instances in 
ActiveTasksw of associated job Jw. These teams thus form a set of teams Q = {Teamx}, 
where 1 ≤ x ≤ δε.  
Once Q is generated each foreman agent uses a selection heuristic R to rank each 
team in Q, where R is the product of a normalized job selection heuristic and team 
selection heuristic. R accordingly contains information about both the value of Jw to the 
foreman agent, via the job selection heuristic, and the potential robustness of Teamx, (that 
is, the team’s ability to handle defections and newly added tasks) via the team selection 
heuristic. Likewise, an agent acting in the worker role uses R to decide between incoming 
proposals and the job and team it is currently part of, if any. 
Each agent Ak in a Teamx is associated with AssignedInstanceskw, which, after a team 
has been formed, represents the set of task instances Tiw that each agent Ak in the team is 
assigned to complete in job Jw. Teams are currently assembled via a semi-random 
approach that seeks to satisfy the various solution requirements one at a time, but nearly 
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any constraint satisfaction solver could also be used. It is also noted that future work in 
this field will likely adapt the above mechanism into an “anytime” algorithm (Sandholm 
and Lesser 1994), wherein agents continually test new configurations of jobs, partners, 
and task assignments, continually improving their current best selection until some 
preferred score is reached or external events halt the search process.  
Each agent is associated with one job selection heuristic and one team selection 
heuristic, which are used by the selection mechanisms described above. More 
particularly, job and team selection heuristics are normalized, so that each heuristic 
produces a value between 0 and 1 which describes how desirable that job or team is, with 
0 being completely undesirable and 1 being completely desirable. Job heuristics attempt 
to maximize agent profit by selecting attractive jobs, while team heuristics attempt to 
select teams that are structured to handle sudden changes in the environment or inside the 
team itself. 
The first job selection heuristic is the pre-normalized Greedy heuristic (Eqn. 1) that 
maximizes the expected reward from a job Jj. While a naive heuristic would simply 
choose jobs that require the greatest amount of work (and thus the greatest amount of 
associated reward), the Greedy heuristic takes the dynamicism of the environment into 
account by giving double weight to portions of a task that have already been completed, 
thereby giving preferential treatment to large jobs that are less likely to undergo changes 
before the job is complete. The heuristic is normalized by dividing an agent’s potential 
profit by the number of skills per agent times the maximum length of each task, which 
represents the maximum theoretical profit an agent can earn from a job. 
 
Greedy heuristic (Eqn. 1):  
 
The second job selection heuristic is the normalized Lean heuristic (Eqn. 2) that 
minimizes the amount of work needed to complete a job, thereby letting agents 
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opportunistically form teams to quickly solve simpler problems in a mechanism similar to 
work by Soh and Tsatsoulis (Soh and Tsatsoulis 2002).  
 
Lean heuristic (Eqn 2):     
 
Note that these mechanisms stand in contrast to previous work in task selection under 
uncertain conditions, such as Hannah and Mouaddib (Hanna and Mouaddib 2002), where 
a problem’s uncertain elements are explicitly modeled probabilities. Instead, the 
heuristics described here operate under any level of uncertainty, from any source. 
However, future work is possible where the above heuristics are adaptive based on a 
known or suspected level of uncertainty in the environment, or in a specific problem. 
The first team selection heuristic is a Null heuristic that does not rank the teams, but 
rather keeps teams ordered according to how the strategy’s job selection heuristic ranked 
the jobs associated with each team. This effectively eliminates the team selection 
heuristic from both selection mechanisms.  
The second team selection heuristic is the normalized Fast heuristic (Eqn. 3) that 
minimizes the maximum amount of work that any member of a Teamx needs to complete. 
Alternatively, the Fast heuristic could be said to minimize the amount of time needed 
before the entire team has completed work on associated job Jw.  
 
Fast heuristic (Eqn.3):  
 
The third team selection heuristic is the normalized Redundant heuristic (Eqn. 4) that 
seeks to maximize the number of redundant skills in Teamx. In other words, the 
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Redundant heuristic prefers teams with multiple agents capable of working on active task 
instances, thereby increasing the ability of a team to deal with the defection of an agent. 
 
Redundant heuristic (Eqn. 4):  
The fourth team selection heuristic is the normalized Auxiliary heuristic that seeks to 
maximize the number of auxiliary skills in Teamx. In other words, the Auxiliary heuristic 
(Eqn. 5) tries to maximize the combined skills of a team that are not immediately 
applicable to task instances in ActiveTasksw, thereby increasing the ability of the team to 
deal with newly added task instances.  
 
Auxiliary heuristic (Eqn. 5):   
 
Note that, intuitively, the Fast, Redundant, and Auxiliary heuristics each prefer a 
greater number of partners in a team, since this increases the amount of work that can be 
done in parallel and the number of unused skills for each partner. Alternatively, the 
normalized MinPartner heuristic (Eqn. 6) prefers teams with the smallest number of 
partners, thereby implicitly using a greater number of skills per partner and thus a greater 
amount of potential profit per partner.  
 





As described above, Research Question 1 is addressed by creating an agent 
simulation that compares the performance of different classes of agents utilizing different 
job and team selection heuristics. The following results were carried out in accordance 
with the approach outlined in section 3.4 above, and were published in (Jones and Barber 
2007). 
 
Table 1: Experimental parameters for RQ1 
Parameter Value 
Number of classes 10 
Agents per class 250 




Initial size of |ActiveTasks| 10 
Range of TaskLength 1 to 10 rounds 
Credit received per round of completed task 
instance 
1 
Number of potential teams examined per top-
rank job 
15 
Dynamicism range 0% to 100%, 25% 
increment 
Number of rounds per simulation 2500 
Number of simulations per dynamicism step 20 
 
Experiments were conducted using the basic parameters in Table 1, which were 
selected to broadly model a problem-solving market internal to an organization such as a 
large corporation or a moderately large number of freelance agents. The experiments 
tested all strategies against each other simultaneously to see which strategies were most 
successful in a field of heterogeneous agents. More particularly, a two-factor ANOVA 
analysis was carried out, and the Fisher LSD method was used to determine significant 








Figure 7: Strategy performance as a function of dynamicism. 
 
Figure 7 displays the average credit earned by each agent class at different levels of 
dynamicism, along with standard deviation bars for each value. An examination of the 
data indicates that the credit earned by each class decreased as the level of dynamicism in 
the environment increased, and that while GreedyMinPartners was the most successful 
strategy for 0% and 25% dynamicism, GreedyAuxiliary was the most successful strategy 
for all other dynamicism levels. ANOVA analysis (alpha = .05) indicates that the strategy 
selection causes statistically significant differences in the results.  
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Furthermore, Fisher LSD tests (alpha = .05 for all comparisons below) indicate that 
the top-performing strategy for each dynamicism level was statistically significant from 
all other strategies, with the exception of 50% dynamicism, where GreedyAuxiliary and 
GreedyFast were statistically significant from all other strategies but not from each other, 
and 100% dynamicism, where GreedyAuxiliary was significantly better than all other 
strategies, save GreedyFast. 
Similar results can be seen when examining the aggregate performance of each team 
selection heuristic, regardless of the job selection heuristic it was paired with: at 0% 
dynamicism, the MinPartner performed significantly better than all other heuristics, and 
better than all but the Null heuristic at 25% dynamicism. At 50% dynamicism, the 
Auxiliary heuristic performed significantly better than all other strategies save the Null 
heuristic, while at 75%, and 100%, the Auxiliary heuristic performed significantly better 
than all heuristics but the Fast heuristic. Comparing the aggregate performance of the job 
selection heuristics, the Greedy job selection heuristic performed significantly better than 
the Fast heuristic at all dynamicism levels.  
To better understand these results, it is helpful to know how successful different 
classes are at forming teams, as shown in Figure 8 as the ratio between the number of 
team formation requests by a foreman and the number of teams successfully formed. 
Furthermore, Figure 9 displays the average success rate of formed teams at completing an 





Figure 8: Ratio of teams successfully formed by class and dynamicism level 
 
As can be seen in Figure 8, certain patterns are immediately obvious. Lean job 
selection strategies are significantly more successful at forming teams than Greedy job 
selection strategies, except at 0% dynamicism, when job requirements do not change. 
This may be due to the fact that, in dynamic environments, a subset of jobs will have a 
lower than average number of tasks, which are more attractive to agents using the Lean 
job selection heuristic, thereby improving the probability that these agents will join a 
team. 
Furthermore, agents using the MinPartner team selection heuristic are far more likely 
to successfully form a team. As discussed below, this is likely due in part to the fact that a 
smaller number of partners imply a smaller number of potential rejections, any one of 
which can break team formation. In addition, a smaller number of agents means a higher 





















Figure 9: Teams successfully formed by class and dynamicism level 
 
Conversely, Figure 9 shows that, although MinPartners is the most successful at 
forming teams, it is consistently the least successful heuristic at forming teams which 
successfully complete their assigned jobs, while the Fast, Redundant, and Auxiliary 
heuristics are consistently the most successful at forming successful teams. In fact, 
ANOVA and LSD analysis (alpha = .05) indicates that, although these three heuristics are 
not always significantly different from each other, they are almost always significantly 
different than the Null and MinPartner heuristics. Again, as discussed above, this is likely 
due to the fact that teams formed according to the Fast, Redundant and Auxiliary 
heuristics are more likely to have team members with unused skills that can be used in 
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the event that another team member leaves the team, or a new task is added to the list of 
ActiveTasks.  
This result suggests that agents that can recognize a team with significant redundant 
or adaptable characteristics may be more successful than agents that cannot. In other 
words, agents which can recognize a proposed team that has a lower offered reward but a 
greater opportunity for success because of its redundant or auxiliary resources may be 
able to earn more credit. 
It is also noted that, although agents using the Lean job selection heuristic are 
significantly more successful at both forming teams and successfully completing jobs, 
these agents are generally less successful than agents that use the Greedy job selection 
heuristic. This may be in part due to the fact that Lean agents generally select jobs with 
far less work involved, and thus earn far less credit per job. Accordingly, it may be 
possible to determine under what circumstances a Lean vs. Greedy job selection heuristic 
is preferred, or even to find an optimal heuristic which combines the two considerations, 
based on environmental characteristics. 
 43 
Chapter 4: Expected Utility-based strategy for Robust 
Team Formation 
 
Research Question 2 states, “How is an agent’s utility in a dynamic, contractless 
environment defined in terms of job and partner selection?” This research question is 
addressed by first providing a formal, mathematical definition of dynamic and 
contractless environments in section 4.1, as well as presenting a revised simulation 
environment which allows for new characteristics, such as quality of service. Based on 
these definitions, section 4.2 presents mathematical formulas which describe the expected 
utility for any given agent working with a given team on a given problem. Section 4.3 
continues to expand on these results by defining a learning mechanism for an agent to 
determine the dynamicism of a given environment based on observations made of the 
agent’s immediate environment, thus allowing us to begin to address the first part of 
Research Question 4, “Can a learning agent adapt its job and partner selections to 




Although the modeling approach previously described in section 3.2 is broadly 
applicable to many different domains, it lacks several useful characteristics that might 
allow it to be more precisely deployed in domains such as consulting. Accordingly, for 
reasons which will be described more fully in Chapter 6, section 4.1 gives an overview of 
certain modifications to our preexisting quantitative model, which now includes the 
ability to describe quality-of-service demands, different rewards for different types of 
tasks, and dependencies between tasks. Based on this revised approach, section 4.2 
provides a definition and derivation of an expected utility-based strategy for robust team 
formation in dynamic, contactless environments. Finally, section 4.3 describes how this 
expected utility-based strategy can be modified to learn, based on observation, 
environmental variables such as average agent reliability and dynamicism values, and to 
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adjust the strategy’s behavior accordingly. The theoretical work provided in this chapter 
is then experimentally verified in Chapter 5. 
We again begin with a set of jobs, J = {jj}, and a set of general tasks, T ={ti}. An 
individual job is composed of a set of specific task instances tij, so that j1 = {ti1}. We also 
have a set of agents, A = {ak}. Each agent has a set of skills AgentSkillsk which is a subset 
of the set of skills S = {si}. Skills and Tasks correspond with each other, so that skills s1 is 
the only skill that can complete an instance t1j.  
More specifically, each task instance tij will have a specific quality of service demand 
associated with it, tijq, and each agent skill sk will have a quality of service capability 
associated with it, skq, such that a task demanding a given quality of service can only be 
completed by a skill with an equal or greater quality of service. For example, t1j2 could be 
completed by s12or s13, but not by s11. The number of degrees of quality of service is 
represented by Q.  
From a practical standpoint, quality of service might also be thought of as 
corresponding to the difficulty associated with a specific type of task. For example, in the 
software domain, creating a small Python search-and-replace script might be thought of 
as requiring a lower quality of service than creating a larger Java project for parsing web 
crawling data, which might in turn be thought of as requiring a lower quality of service 
than creating a distributed operating system in C++. Likewise, service providers capable 
of providing a given quality of service are usually capable of completing tasks requiring a 
lower quality of service, but not a higher quality of service. A working engineer with a 
few years of programming experience, for example, might be ideally suited to create the 
Java project for parsing web crawling data described above, and also be capable of 
creating the previously mentioned Python script, but not be capable of creating the C++-
based operating system.  
Task instances tij for each job in {jj} are divided into two groups: ActiveTasksj and 
InactiveTasksj. All task instances in ActiveTasksj must be fully completed by an agent 
before job jj is considered complete. Task instances in InactiveTasksj are irrelevant to the 
completion of the job. For any job jj, ActiveTasksj∪InactiveTasksj  = {tij} for all i, and 
ActiveTasksj∩InactiveTasksj = ∅. Alternatively, all inactive task instances may be 
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thought of as having a required quality of service of level 0, with no payment given for 
completing the task. 
Agents, utilizing skills over time, can complete tasks. Each task instance tij has a task 
length TaskLengthij associated with it, which represents the number of timesteps that an 
agent must use the appropriate skill for the task instance to be complete. Accordingly, 
function C(tij) is defined as a value ranging from 0 to TaskLengthij, and represents the 
amount of time that one or more agents have worked on tij. 
Jobs have too many task instances in ActiveTasks for a single agent to complete the 
entire job by itself; therefore teams of agents are required. For a given job jw, a team of 
agents Teamw is formed. Teamw is defined by a set of agents {an}, and a set of assigned 
task instances AssignedInstancesnw for each agent an,. Each AssignedInstancesnw 
represents the set of task instances from ActiveTasksw that an is assigned to complete. 
AssignedInstancesnw do not overlap between agents in Teamw, and the union of all 
AssignedInstancesnw for all agents in Teamw equals ActiveTasksw. 
Agents work on one team, and one job, at a time. To remain part of a team, an agent 
must work on a task instance from its AssignedInstances until all task instances are 
complete. To leave a team, an agent simply ceases working on its AssignedInstances. 
Task instances have non-transferable utility, so that task instances pay benefits only 
when all active tasks in the job are completed, and only to the agent that completed the 
task instance. (Agents which partially complete a task and quit are therefore not 
rewarded.) Task payoff depends on three factors – a base payoff per general task type, a 
length multiplier, and a multiplier depending on the quality of service required for that 
particular task instance.  
So, for example, a general task t1 might have a base payoff of 3, while a general task 
t2 might have a base payoff of 9. To determine the payoff for a specific task instance, we 
have to know the length of the task and quality of service multiplier for that particular 
instance. So, for example, if the multiplier is 1 for quality of service level 1, 10 for 
service level 2, and 100 for service level 3, then t1a1 with a length of 3 will have a payoff 
of 9, t1b2 will have a payoff of 90, t1c3 will have a payoff of 900. Likewise, t2a1 with a 
length of 5 will have a payoff of 45, t2b2 will have a payoff of 450, t2c3 will have a payoff 
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of 4500. Task payoff for a given task instance can be expressed as a function Value(tijq). 
Of course, this assumes an agent has the skills necessary to complete the task; if the agent 
does not, Value(tijq) is simply 0. 
Note that the multiplier differences between task types and tasks lengths given in the 
example above are approximately linear, while the multiplier differences between 
different qualities of service are exponential. This is intentional, because although the 
quantitative model given here and the expected utility-based strategy described in the 
next section can deal with any arbitrarily different multipliers, it is believed that in many 
domains, including the consulting domain described in Chapter 6, there are extreme 
differences in the market power of agents capable of providing different quality of 
service levels. For example, in the software domain described above, an undergrad 
engineering student capable of writing Python scripts might be easily hired at a rate of 
$10/hr, while someone capable of creating an operating system from scratch might be a 
PhD-level researcher requiring a salary equivalent to many hundreds of dollars an hour. 
Task instances may have dependencies between each other, such that one task cannot 
be completed until another is finished. Task dependencies become active or inactive 
along with the tasks they are associated with: if task B is dependent on task A and both 
are initially active, then task B cannot be started until A is completed. However, if task A 
becomes inactive, than task B can be started immediately. Alternatively, if task A is 
initially inactive but later becomes active, then work on task B may have to be delayed 
until task A is complete. This implies that some agents may be relatively idle while they 
wait for required tasks to be completed before they can start their next task assignment, 
and that such delays may effect an agent’s expected profitability, as an agent is only paid 
for the tasks it completes.  
 
Given these terms, we can define the following fundamental criteria for this research: 
 
A Dynamic Environment is one where task instances are shuffled between 
ActiveTasksj and InactiveTasksj, or the quality of service demand of an active task 
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instance changes with a probability D, where D is the dynamicism of the environment. 
More particularly, D represents the probability that a specific task instance in a job jw will 
either move from Active to Inactive, or vice versa depending on its initial state, or that 
the quality of service demanded for a specific task instance will change, during the 
lifetime of the task. In contrast, in a static environment, D is always 0, and the 
requirements for a job do not change over time. This is described by equations 7 and 8 
below.  
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P tij ∈ InactiveTasks j ,time= x,tij ∈ ActiveTasks j,time=(x+Length(tij ))( ) = D 
 
An Unenforcable Contract between agents is one where agents suffer no penalty for 
ceasing to work on its assigned task instances. We can therefore write a utility function 
for an agent with an unenforceable contract, where, upon successful completion of all 
ActiveTasksj, agents earn a payoff equal to Value(tijq) of for each task instance they have 
successfully completed, and the payoff for ceasing to work on AssignedInstances is 
simply 0. In contrast, an enforcable leveled commitment or contingency contract might 
have a negative payoff for ceasing work on AssignedInstances. 
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Where times is the time the agent joins the team, and timee is the time all instances in 
ActiveTasksj are complete. 
 
A Selfish Agent is an agent whose goal is to maximize its own profit, which it tries to 
achieve by maximizing a heuristic function H(jw, Teamw) that describes its potential 
payoff for working on different jobs with different teams. Details of various heuristics are 
described above in Chapter 3, while the expected utility-based strategy described in 
section 5.2 below essentially represents another heuristic. For comparative purposes, a 
selfless agent would have the goal of maximizing the overall profit or utility of an entity 
other than itself, and accordingly try to maximize a different function, one that represents 
the overall payoff to a team or the common good. However, all agents described in this 
dissertation are purely selfish, and only try to maximize their own utility, with no concern 
for the utility or well-being of other entities. 
Selfish Agent maximization function (Eqn. 10): 
€ 





As described above in section 3.4, previous work in this area has focused on 
evaluating different heuristic functions used to estimate an agent’s payoff for working on 
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specific jobs and teams. In contrast, the following work tries to build an expected utility-
based function that takes into consideration all factors that affect the profit that an agent 
will actually earn. We therefore present Equation 11, which represents the simple 
observation that an agent’s expected earnings equal its final payoff from a job, multiplied 
by the probability that the job is completed and the probability that the team is 




ExpectedPayoff ( jw,Teamw ) = PComplete( jw,Teamw ) *Payoff ( jw,Teamw )
*PFormation( jw,Teamw )
 
Drilling down, we examine what factors affect the probability that a team will 
complete a given job. Equation 12 states that a job will be completed as long as the skill 
set of the team working on the job is sufficient to complete all the active tasks within the 
job. Given that all teams initially possess the skills needed to complete a given job, there 
are two ways a team can find itself without a needed skill: either a new task is added to 
the list of active tasks that the team lacks the ability to handle, or a current team member 
quits, depriving the team of a previously needed task. (This analysis obviously applies 
only to the case where new team members cannot be recruited.) 
 
(Eqn. 12):  
 
€ 
PComplete( jw,Teamw ) =1− (P(Unsolvable( jw,Teamw )∪Defect( jw,Teamw )))
 
To determine probability that a new task will be added to a job that the current team 
cannot handle, we must determine the probability that a task will transition to a specific 
alternate quality of service state. Since the probability that a task will transition at all is 
D, and there are Q other states to transition to (inactive tasks can transition to 1 of Q 
quality of service levels, active tasks can transition to (Q-1) alternative quality of service 
levels, plus one inactive state) then the probability of it transitioning to a particular state 
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is D/Q. Depending on the skills composition of the team, some quality of service levels 
can be handled and some cannot; for each task we count the number of quality of service 
states that cannot be handled. If we represent the number of states per task that cannot be 
handled by X, the probability that a specific task will transition to an unsolvable state is 
XD/Q. We can then write the probability that this transition will not occur as 1-(XD/Q), 
and multiply this value for all tasks together to determine the probability that no task in 
the job will transition to an unsolvable state. The probability that the job will transition to 












The probability that a current team member will defect from the current team depends 
on multiple factors, chief of which is the logic driving the agent’s decision process for 
leaving a team. In a massively multiscale environment composed of extremely 
heterogeneous agents, we might plausibly make the argument that because there are so 
many possible mechanisms for agents to use in deciding when to defect, some of which 
may not even be rational, it is therefore impossible to actually calculate the probability 
that an agent will defect from the team.  
For example, consider two plausible heuristics that an agent might use in ranking 
potential jobs. A greedy heuristic might simply seek to have each agent earn more from a 
job – thus, if agent earnings are roughly proportional to how much work an agent does, 
then a greedy agent will prefer a job where it is given more to do, and will conceivably 
leave its current job if another job with substantially more work/earnings involved, is 
offered to it. Alternatively a “lean” heuristic is one where an agent seeks only to work on 
many quick, low-risk jobs, rather than a smaller number of large, high-risk jobs. Again, if 
we assume that agents earn roughly in proportion to the amount of work they do, then 
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“lean” agents will prefer smaller jobs, and conceivably leave their current job if a job 
which can be completed more quickly is offered to it.  
Note, however, that these approaches are directly opposed to each other – a new job 
which would tempt an agent using a greedy strategy to defect will not tempt an agent 
using a lean strategy, and vice versa. In the instance where agent behavior is relatively 
heterogeneous, we might be able to develop a theoretical model that derives an agent’s 
chance of defection based on how happy it is with its current job, and how likely it is that 
a “better” offer would come along. However, among heterogeneous agents, such a model 
is impossible because of conflicting heuristics, and we are left with the option of simply 
learning by observation, over time, how likely an agent is to defect. This could be done 
by direct experience, shared reputation, or a mixture of both, either for every individual 
potential partner agent, for different classes of similar agents, or for a general profile of 
all possible agents.  
We can therefore describe a probability PAgentDefect, which is the probability that 
an average agent will defect. From this we can define PDefect(jw, Teamw) by first figuring 
out how many partner agents are critical to the team (i.e. how many agents provide a 
required skill that no other agent on the team can provide).  We can then calculate the 





















Addendum: future work will reexamine equations 14 and 15 based on the premise 
that simultaneous defections by agents are possible. However, given that altering the 
equations above to include team failures due to simultaneous defections would make the 
EU strategy more pessimistic, and the results of section 5.2 below suggest the EU 
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strategy is already overly pessimistic, this is not currently believed to be a fatal flaw in 
the EU strategy. 
Note that we may wish to treat the probability of an agent defecting and the 
probability of a problem becoming unsolvable as independent, since there are potentially 
an exponential number of sub-teams that can be formed once agents start defecting, each 
of which has a different likelihood that it will encounter an unsolvable job configuration. 






PComplete( jw,Teamw ) =1− (PUnsolvable( jw,Teamw ) +PDefect( jw,Teamw ) −
(PUnsolvable( jw,Teamw ) *PDefect( jw,Teamw )))
 
 
The probability that a team will successfully be formed is the product of how likely 
each potential team member (less the agent running the expected utility strategy) is to 
join the team. This likelihood in turn is the sum of likelihood that a team member is idle 
(and thus, completely likely to join a proposed team) and, in the case that the agents are 
not idle, the likelihood that they will defect from their current teams. Equation 17 




PFormation( jw,Teamw ) = (PIdle + PAgentDefect(1− PIdle))
( Teamx −1)  
 
The payoff each agent on the team receives, assuming the job is completed, is the 
sum of how many time steps each agent has spent working on completed tasks. To a first 
approximation, this value is the sum of three distinct components: the payoff value of all 
the tasks the agent is currently assigned to, the payoff value of all the tasks that the agent 
may receive, should they become active, and the payoff value off all tasks reassigned to 






Payoff ( jw,Teamw ) = ActiveTaskPayoff ( jw,Teamw )
+InactiveTaskPayoff ( jw,Teamw ) + ReassignedTaskPayoff ( jw,Teamw )  
 
We begin by calculating the expected value of a single task, ExpectedValue(tijq). We 
calculate this by adding the value of every possible quality of service, multiplied by the 

















By calculating this for all active tasks an agent is assigned to, we can figure out the 
first part of the equation above. 
 
(Eqn. 20):  
 
The expected payoff for all inactive tasks that an agent may be assigned is the 
probability that the task will become active multiplied by the probability that the task will 
be assigned to a specific agent, multiplied by the expected payoff for the task. (The work 
below assumes that an inactive task (quality of service level 0) can become active with 
any quality of service level, and that different subsets of agents may be capable of 

















Finally, the expected payoff for active tasks reassigned from a defecting agent is the 
probability that another agent will defect, multiplied by the probability that the task will 
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Although we have determined the likely payoff for a given job/team combination, we 
have not yet determined the likely duration of such a job. Calculating the duration of such 
a job is extremely difficult due to several factors – changing tasks, changing 
dependencies, and a changing team of agents to complete the same work. Rather than 
explicitly identify every possible permutation of teams and task assignments, we instead 
take a more probabilistic approach and choose to represent the range of potential job 
durations as being part of a distribution range – more specifically, a beta distribution, 
using methodology borrowed from the project management domain. 
More specifically, a beta distribution is useful because we first expect that the 
duration distribution will be asymmetrical – that defections and additional tasks added to 
the job will lengthen the duration, but, because of existing dependencies, removing 
existing tasks may not significantly shorten the duration. (E.g., if tasks A and B are being 
worked on in parallel, and are prerequisites for task C, then the removal of task A or B by 
itself will not greatly shorten the expected duration.) 
A beta distribution allows us to model this asymmetry by allowing us to calculate an 
expectation value for the duration based on 3 easily calculable numbers: the most likely 
duration m (i.e. the starting duration, or simply the critical path of the original task 
assignments), the minimum duration a (i.e. 0, assuming all currently assigned tasks drop 
out) and the maximum duration b (i.e. the worst-case scenario, assuming all possible 
tasks are assigned to the agent in question, and all possible dependencies are enabled, and 
worked as slowly as possible.) Note also that the maximum duration b is further refined 
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as work on a job progresses and some tasks become permanently inactive, and thus not 
part of the maximum possible duration. Once we have these three values, Equation 23 
describes our expected duration value, based on techniques taken from project 




Duration( jw,Teamw ) =




Furthermore, by dividing our expected payoff value by this number, we can figure out 
the expected earnings per unit of time for a given job. It is this number which takes the 
place of H in Equation 10, since we wish to maximize an agent’s earnings within a fixed 




ExpectedEarningsPerTimestep( jw,Teamw ) =







The expected utility-based strategy described in section 4.2 above is capable of 
deciding which combinations of jobs to work on and agents to work with are likely to be 
most profitable. However, the above strategy does depend on certain known quantities 
such as PAgentDefect, PIdle, and the dynamicism of the environment, D. For comparison 
purposes with existing heuristic-based strategies, these values are provided to the strategy 
in many of the experiments carried out in section 5.1 below.  
However, in several real-world domains these values cannot be directly provided to 
the strategy because they are not directly known, but rather must be learned by the 
strategy itself. Accordingly, this section describes several learning mechanisms which 
allow an agent executing the expected utility-based strategy to be placed into an 
environment where it does not know the local dynamicism or agent reliability, learn the 
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values, and thereby improve its earnings performance, thereby allowing us to address 
RQ4. 
Initial approaches to the problem of learning values such as environmental 
dynamicism focused on reinforcement learning mechanisms such as Monte Carlo or 
Dynamic Programming methods (Sutton and Barto 1998).  However, upon further 
reflection reinforcement learning is not necessary for the learning required in this 
instance. Specifically, reinforcement learning is most useful when learning how to deal 
with a problem that cannot be easily or fully modeled by direct observation, and often 
involves a direct mapping of specific actions or strategies to expected numeric rewards 
based solely on repeated experience.  
Moreover, reinforcement learning mechanisms observe and learn specific reward 
distributions that are unique to a given action. This differentiation of observed values is 
not necessary in cases where the observed value distributions are independent of the 
action taken. Indeed, this is the case with regard to the dynamic, contractless domain 
examined by this research, since key variables such as the dynamicism of the 
environment are fully independent of the actions (e.g. selecting jobs and partners) taken 
by the agent.  
Accordingly, the focus of this section is primarily on how to accurately translate 
observations of events such as active/inactive status changes of task instances to 
meaningful values such as the dynamicism value D. In fact, in the case of variables such 
as PIdle and PAgentDefect, little translation is necessary.  
One of the simplest mechanisms for estimating PIdle is for the agent executing the 
expected utility-based strategy to keep track of its own percentage of time spent idle vs. 
time spent working as a worker or foreman agent. This value can then be extrapolated to 
be representative of all agents, and is a reasonable assumption to make in instances where 
all agents take the initiative to be leaders approximately the same percentage of the time, 
and where the primary difference between agents is their skill set, rather than their 
strategy (which cannot be observed by individual agents in these experiments.) This is the 
mechanism used for the experiments carried out below in chapter 5.  
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However, it is noted that, should these assumptions not hold true, a different 
mechanism might be required for determining the probability of team formation than the 
one described in Equation 17 above. Such an alternate mechanism might involve directly 
observing the percentage of times a team formation attempt is successful, or even using 
reinforcement learning to distinguish different probabilities of successful team formation 
based on how many potential partners are in a given team.  
Likewise, PAgentDefect may be directly observed by simply keeping track of how 
many agents leave a team in the course of working on a job, and dividing this number by 
the total number of agents worked with. This is the mechanism used in the experiments 
described below in Chapter 5. More complex methods are also of course applicable 
(Fullam 2007), but such methods are more properly thought of as belonging to the trust 
and reputation research domain, and will not be further discussed here. 
In contrast, determining the dynamicism value D purely from observations of how 
frequently task instances change is somewhat complicated. If all jobs ran to completion 
regardless of task changes, it would be trivially easy to find on average of how many task 
instances changed inactive/active state, or changed the quality of service required for 
completion, and calculate D accordingly. However, because changes in job requirements 
frequently make a job unsolvable for a given team, jobs and individual task instances are 
only partially observed. This in turn means that not all examples of status changes for a 
given job will be counted, which makes any such average derived from these 
observations inaccurate. 
Furthermore, although changes, once they occur, can be considered fully observed, 
task instances which do not change cannot be considered fully observed until the task is 
fully complete, which may not occur if the team disbands prematurely. If a task instance 
has been 80% completed and has not changed, should it be counted as being an 
unchanged task or not? 
Lastly, it is also the case that task instances do not change from one state to another in 
a uniform and consistent manner. More specifically, task instances which change from 
inactive to active occur within the first 10 time steps of a job’s lifetime, whereas task 
instances which are already active and change quality of service requirements, or change 
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to inactive task instances, only occur once the task instance has been partially completed 
to some preset degree. (See section 3.3 above.) This may lead to situations where many 
task instance changes are observed soon after a job is started, whereas the vast majority 
of unchanged task instances cannot be observed until a substantial portion of the job is 
completed, again leading to inaccurate estimates of the dynamicism level. 
Accordingly, the equations below describe the mechanism by which dynamicism is 
observed. Broadly speaking, we wish to determine the percentage of task instances which 
change state, which we can calculate by dividing the number of observed task instance 
change events by the number of total task instances observed. Determining the number of 
observed task instance changes (ObservedActiveEvents) is trivial – all we have to do is 
count the number of task instances where the quality has changed during the lifetime of 




ObservedActiveEvents( jw ) =








Determining the number of observed task instances that do not change 
(ObservedStaticEvents) is more difficult. As discussed above, task instance event may be 
partially completed when a job is abandoned, and if the task instance event has not 
changed state during that partial observation, that does not imply that a static event (that 
is, a lack of change) has occurred. Rather, at best we can talk about the probability that a 
static event has occurred. Moreover, since the probability that a task instance will change 
is evenly distributed throughout its lifetime (i.e. a task instance can change quality of 
service or become inactive after each timestep that it has been worked on, with the 
exception of the last), the probability that a static event has occurred is proportional to the 
task instance’s completion percentage. For example, if 9 out of 10 total steps of a task 
instance have been completed, there is a 90% chance that the task instance is static. We 
can therefore talk about observing partial static events, and add these partial static events 
together to determine the total number of static events observed thus far in a job. 
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Further note that these partial static events are calculated differently depending on 
whether the task instance is initially active or inactive. As described above, inactive tasks 
that change will do so towards the beginning of a job’s lifetime, within the maximum 
length of an individual task instance (e.g. 10 timesteps). Alternatively, active task 
instances which change do so depending on how much of the instance has been 
completed. Accordingly, Equation 26 calculates ObservedStaticEvents differently 
depending on whether the initial quality of service is 0 (inactive) or not. 
  
 (Eqn. 26): 
€ 
ObservedActiveEvents( jw ) =
if q is not constant, 0


































Although observing partial static events allows us to better estimate the dynamicism 
value for an environment, it can also be misleading in some circumstances. More 
specifically, at very high levels of dynamicism (i.e. 60% or greater), teams have a much 
higher chance of failure, and as such disband very quickly. The observations made during 
these brief intervals of job activity may not accurately capture the true levels of 
dynamicism, since many partial static observations may indicate that task instances are 
not changing, although these same instances would change if given enough time.  
For example, consider a job comprising 10 active task instances, where all task 
instances will eventually change. Assume that work begins simultaneously on many 
different task instances, but only a small percentage of the instances are complete before 
some of the task instances change to a higher quality of service that the team does not 
possess, forcing the team to disband. In this situation an agent might have observed 3 out 
of 10 active events, and might have observed 2 partial static events in sum. The 
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straightforward calculation of dynamicism from this data might lead the agent to believe 
that D = 3 / (2+3), or 60%. However, in actuality, since all task instances would have 
eventually changed, the correct value of D is 100%. 
Accordingly, it is the case that, at higher levels of dynamicism, partially observed 
static events should count for less. We accomplish this by weighting these events 
differently if the observed dynamicism is higher. Specifically, we wish to raise the value 
of a partially observed static event to an exponential power of 1 or greater, thereby giving 
less importance to largely incomplete task instances, while maintaining the importance of 
mostly or fully complete task instances. Equation 27 provides a model for how the 
ObservationExponent value seen in Equation 26 would be calculated, whereby at 
observed dynamicism values of less than .58, the value is 1, at observed dynamicism 
values of greater than .68, the value is 2, and between .58 and .68, the value increases 
linearly.1 Therefore, if the observed dynamicism value is 80%, then a task instance which 
had been 20% completed but not observed to change would count as only .04 of a static 
event, while a task instance that was 90% complete would count as .81 of a static event, 
















Finally, Equation 28 shows how the values of ObservedActiveEvents and 
ObservedStaticEvents are brought together to determine the observed dynamicism value 
for a single job – simply put, the number of observed active events is divided by the 
number of total observed events, which is in turn the sum of the observed active events 
and observed static events. 
                                                
1 The value .58 was determined through informal experimentation, and gives reasonably accurate results, as 
seen below in chapter 5. However, it is freely admitted that this method is only a first approximation, and 
that further refinement as to how ObservationExponent is calculated could lead to better approximations of 





ObservedDynamicism( jw ) =
ObservedActiveEvents( jw )
ObservedActiveEvents( jw ) +ObservedStaticEvents( jw )
 
 
Equation 28 gives the observed dynamicism for a single job; to estimate the value of 
dynamicism for all the jobs in an environment, we simply average our observations for 
multiple observed jobs, which allows us to converge on the actual value of D, assuming 
D stays fixed. Moreover, basic statistics tells us that the more observations we make of D, 
the closer our average gets to the actual value of D. 
However, if D is not fixed, but rather changes over time, past observations of D might 
need to be discounted. Two straightforward ways of doing this are to create a sliding 
observation window, where only relatively recent observations of D are used to calculate 
the probable value of D, or to exponentially discount the influence an observation of D 
has on the average depending on the age of the observation. As will be seen below in 
Chapter 5, both of these mechanisms are compared to the all-inclusive running average of 
D described above to test the efficacy of each mechanism against a changing or outright 






The expected utility-based theory described above in Chapter 4 is easily translatable 
to an expected utility (EU) strategy which is believed to be more profitable than existing 
heuristic strategies in dynamic, contractless environments. Accordingly, this chapter 
presents the results of several experiments that examine the effectiveness of the expected 
utility-based (EU) strategy, both in comparison to new and existing strategies, and in 
terms of how accurate the strategy’s predictions of future job behavior are. This work 
thereby allows us to address Research Question 3, “How do sagents acting in accordance 
with the utility theory found in RQ2 perform in contractless, dynamic environments?” 
More particularly, section 5.1 compares the profitability and effectiveness of the 
expected utility-based strategy (EU strategy) against both the existing heuristic-based 
strategies described in Chapter 3, and several new strategies which represent an absolute 
standard of comparison – a “Master” strategy which prohibits partner agents from 
quitting a team, and an “Oracle” strategy which is aware of all task instance changes a 
job will undergo before the job begins. Section 5.2 examines the accuracy of the 
individual components of the expected utility-based (EU) strategy calculation to 
determine how those predictions (i.e. expected profit, job duration, and probability of 
success) compare to actual observed results.  
Lastly, we finish addressing RQ4 in section 5.3 by examining the different learning 
mechanisms described above in section 4.3 (observing dynamicism per job and 
determining environmental dynamicism, D, via a running average, sliding window, or 
exponential weighting of past data) by first comparing the performance of each learning 
mechanism to the performance of an expected utility-based strategy which is provided the 
exact value of D. The section then examines which mechanism is most profitable when 
faced with a simulation environment where D changes over time, and how closely the 




We begin with a brief review of the relative performance of some of the heuristic 
strategies described above in Chapter 3. More particularly, Figure 10 below illustrates the 
relative performance of ten different heuristic-based strategies using the parameters found 
in Table 2. Note that agent classes and skills are stochastically assigned to agents, so that, 
on average, agents and skills are evenly distributed between classes. However, the 
resulting spread in exactly how many agents and skills are found in each simulation run is 
likely decrease the sensitivity of the results presented below to any specific simulation 
parameters. While the Greedy and Lean job selection heuristics and the Null, Fast, 
Auxiliary and Redundant team selection heuristics are identical to those described above 
in Chapter 3, the Hybrid team selection heuristic is new. Simply put, the Hybrid team 
heuristic is a straightforward average of the Auxiliary and Redundant team selection 
heuristic. 
 
Table 2: Experimental parameters for Figure 10 
Parameter Value 
Number of agents 2000 
Per round chance of agent acting as foreman 5% 
Jobs 1000 
Number of total skills 10 
Degrees of quality of service per task 3 
Number of skills per agent 5 
Average number of active tasks per job 6 
Range of task lengths 2 to 10 rounds 
Range of task values 1 to 10 
Value of quality of service multiplier 1, 10, or 100 
Average probability a task has at least one prerequisite 
task 
50% 
Number of top-rank jobs examined 5 
Number of potential teams examined per top-rank job 25 
Dynamicism range 0% to 100%, 20% 
increment 
Number of rounds per simulation 1000 





































As can be seen from the graphs above, agents executing the greedy job selection 
heuristic earn more profit when jobs are static (i.e. D = 0%), but as dynamicism 
increases, agents executing the lean job selection heuristic earn more profit. T-testing of 
the two populations confirms a statistically significant advantage of greedy job selection 
heuristics in static environments, and an advantage for lean job selection heuristics in 
environments with 60% or greater dynamicism.2 No specific team selection heuristic was 
notably superior across the entire dynamic range. It is noted that the differences in 
scenario details makes a direct comparison between these results and those given in 
chapter 3 pointless (e.g. no quality of service differences in earlier results, different 
mechanism used to determine agent profit), although these graphs are useful for 
comparison purposes when considering relative performance of other strategies (e.g. 
expected utility-based or oracle strategies) in combination with these heuristic-based 
strategies. 
As previously discussed above, in addition to comparing the expected utility-based 
strategy described in Chapter 4 to existing heuristic-based strategies, we also wish to 
compare the expected utility-based strategy to a more absolute measure of profitability. 
Towards that end, we have created three additional strategies which do not function under 
the same set of rules previously established for our existing strategies. More specifically, 
we have created a Master strategy, which functions identically to a GreedyNull heuristic 
strategy, except that any partner agents working on a team with the Master agent as the 
foremen are prohibited from quitting the team unless they have completed all their 
assigned tasks.  
Similarly, we have created an Oracle strategy, which again functions the same as a 
GreedyNull heuristic strategy, except that the Oracle strategy is capable of perceiving 
both the current active/inactive status and quality of service status of each task instance, 
and what the ultimate status of that task instance will be. In other words, an Oracle agent 
perceives both the current and final skill requirements of a job, and as such, will 
                                                
2 Note that all statistical comparisons designated as significant feature alpha = 5%. 
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preferentially select teams that it knows can complete all the current and future tasks of a 
job over teams that cannot. This gives the Oracle agent a far better chance of completing 
jobs as a foreman, even in highly dynamic environments. 
Lastly, we have combined the Master and Oracle strategy to create a MasterOracle 
strategy, which is again similar to a GreedyNull strategy, except that like the Oracle 
strategy it preferentially selects teams that it knows can successfully complete a job, and 
like the Master strategy, partner agents cannot quit a team that is headed by a 
MasterOracle agent. Unlike the expected utility-based strategy, therefore, the 
MasterOracle strategy operates in a static, contracted environment, since it does not risk 
agent defections or unexpected changes in task requirements for a job. The MasterOracle 
thus represents a best case performance for an agent operating in a dynamic, contractless 
environment, and is therefore a more objective standard of comparison than the existing 
heuristic-based strategies.  
Figures 11 shows the performance of the same heuristic-based strategies from Figure 
10, but with the addition of the EU strategy. More specifically, the experimental 
parameters laid out in Table 2 were used for the following experiments, except that rather 
than 2000 agents being assigned into 10 classes, the 2000 agents were assigned into 11 
classes. As can be readily seen from Figure 11, the expected utility-based strategy 
significantly outperformed all other heuristic-based strategies, often earning more than 
double the next-highest earner. ANOVA and t-testing confirms both a statistically 
significant spread in strategies, and a statistically significant advantage of the EU strategy 
over all other heuristic-based strategies in all dynamicism levels. 
Interestingly, agents executing lean job selection heuristics earned more than agents 
executing greedy job selection heuristics at all dynamicism levels, as opposed to Figure 
10, where agents using the greedy heuristics earned more in static environments. Figures 
12a and 12b, which show the breakdown of average profits earned in the worker role as 
broken down by class and dynamicism, indicate that this is likely because workers 
executing the lean job selection heuristic earned significantly more at all dynamicism 
levels when expected utility-based strategy agents were included in the simulation 
(except for a totally static environment, according to t-testing).  
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This is likely because lean agents are less likely to abandon their current jobs than 
greedy agents, as seen above in Chapter 3, and, since expected utility-based foremen are 
far more likely to successfully complete jobs, as evidenced by their greater total earnings, 
agents that stick with successful foremen are more likely in turn to improve their 
earnings.  
Figures 13 – 15 show the performance of the same heuristic-based strategies from 
Figure 10, but with the addition of one of the following new classes: Master, Oracle, or 
MasterOracle. As with Figure 12, the experimental parameters laid out in Table 2 were 
used for the following experiments, except that rather than 2000 agents being assigned 
into 10 classes, the 2000 agents were assigned into 11 classes. Figure 16 shows the 
earnings of the expected utility-based strategy, Master and Oracle strategies as 





































Figure 12 a-b: Average worker profit by class and dynamicism level including 












































































































































Figure 16: Strategy Earnings compared to MasterOracle Strategy 
 
 
As can be seen in figures 10 – 16 above, the MasterOracle strategy unsurprisingly 
outperforms all other strategies when any degree of dynamicism is introduced into the 
environment. Moreover, the MasterOracle strategy outperforms both the individual 
Master and Oracle strategies in virtually all circumstances, as verified by ANOVA and t-
testing3. This is unsurprising, since the MasterOracle agent does not deal with the same 
primary issues – unpredictably changing tasks and defecting partners – that the other 
strategies must deal with. 
The Oracle strategy outperforms the Master and expected utility-based strategies at 
all dynamicism levels except for a purely static environment, and, in fact, maintains a 
constant percentage of roughly 30 to 40 percent of MasterOracle earnings at all 
dynamicism levels, as seen in Figure 16. Because the Oracle strategy can predict job 
                                                
3 An obvious exception is the Master strategy at 0% dynamicism, since the Master and MasterOracle 
strategies are effectively the same at this point, because the Master and MasterOracle strategies both have 

















requrements, this is likely because a relatively high percentage of teams in the Oracle 
simulations fail due to defections, which is not an issue for the MasterOracle strategy. 
Note, however, that the advantage the Oracle agent possesses – effectively being able 
to see into the future – is not likely to be found in many real-world environments. In 
contrast, it is possible to form structures where agents have virtually no probability of 
defection (although not in all domains, and not without some overhead cost.) That being 
the case, it is noteworthy that the performance of the expected utility-based strategy 
tracks the performance of the defection-free Master strategy so closely, and, at higher 
dynamicism levels, even surpasses it. This strongly suggests that the risk of building 
teams of defection-prone agents can be managed, at least to some extent, and that 
creating flexible teams that can deal with changes in task requirements may be even more 
important than creating teams where defections are not possible. 
Direct comparison of the performance of the expected utility-based strategy to the 
MasterOracle strategy shows that the expected utility-based strategy is within 80% of the 
earnings of the MasterOracle strategy in a static environment, and steadily decreases 
from approximately 25% of MasterOracle earnings at 20% dynamicism to approximately 
6% of MasterOracle earnings at 100% dynamicism. That being the case, it is noteworthy 
that the EU strategy, which operates in a highly uncertain, defection-prone environment, 
is generally within one order of magnitude as successful as the MasterOracle strategy, 
which faces neither of the two primary difficulties the expected utility-based strategy was 
designed to deal with. 
To further verify the utility and performance of the expected utility-based strategy 
relative to the MasterOracle strategy, a further series of experiments was carried out 
using the parameters described below in Table 3. More precisely, five different 
experiments were carried out by taking the baseline parameters from Table 2, and altering 
those parameters in one specific direction to explore different types of environments and 
settings: environments where jobs begin with a greater number of required tasks, 
environments where the number of possible tasks and skills is much greater, 
environments where agents are scarce compared to the number of jobs, environments 
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where jobs are scarce compared to the number of agents, and environments where agents 





















2000  2000  2000  200  2000  2000 
Total Jobs  1000  1000  1000  1000  1000  100 
Global 
skills 
10  10  20  10  10  10 
Skills per 
agent 
5  8  5  5  2  5 
 
Figures 17 – 21 provide the results of experiments carried out using the various 
parameters listed in Table 3. Specifically, Figure 17a shows the ten heuristic strategies 
operating alongside the MasterOracle strategy using the Many Agent Skills parameters 
from Table 3, while Figure 17b shows the expected utility-based strategy executing 
alongside the heuristic strategies in an experiment using the Many Agent Skills 
parameters. Similarly, Figure 18 shows a comparison of the MasterOracle and expected 
utility-based strategy using the Many Global Skills parameters, Figure 19 shows a 
comparison of the strategies with the Scarce Agents parameters, Figure 20 a comparison 
with the Scarce Agent Skills parameters, and Figure 21 a comparison with the Scarce 
Jobs parameters. Finally, Figure 22 shows the expected utility-based strategy earnings as 






















































Figure 18 a-b: Master Oracle and expected utility-based strategies with Many 













































































Figure 20 a-b: Master Oracle and expected utility-based strategies with Scarce 

















































































Figure 22: Expected utility-based strategy compared to MasterOracle for alternate 
experimental parameters 
 
As can be seen from Figures 17 – 22 above, the broad pattern seen in the baseline 
experiments continues to hold true for the alternate experimental parameters found in 
Table 3: while the expected utility-based strategy generally outperforms the preexisting 
heuristic based strategies, the MasterOracle strategy dominates the EU strategy in 
earnings. Pairwise t-testing of MasterOracle and EU strategy earnings for all alternate test 
parameters shows that MO significantly outperforms EU on all parameters and at all 
dynamicism levels, except for the MAS, SA, and SJ parameters when D = 0%. 
Of somewhat greater interest is how the EU strategy functions in different types of 
experiments. ANOVA analysis indicates a statistically significant spread between all 
heuristic strategies and the EU strategies at all parameters and dynamicism levels, except 
for the Many Skills parameters at 80% and 100%, as will be discussed in further detail 
below. The EU strategy comes closest to competing against the MasterOracle strategy in 
the Scarce Jobs experiments – in fact, in completely static environments, both the 



















in low dynamicism environments, the EU strategy is only slightly better than the heuristic 
strategies. This is likely because, in an environment where competition for jobs is fierce, 
agents have less of an opportunity to defect from their current job, making it easier for 
any foreman agent, regardless of its strategy, to succeed. 
The Scarce Agent and Many Agent Skill experimental parameters are broadly similar 
in result to the baseline parameters, both in how the EU strategy compares to the heuristic 
strategies, and in how the EU strategy compares to the MasterOracle strategy. However, 
the results of the Scarce Agent Skills and Many Global Skills experiments are interesting. 
Note that even the MasterOracle strategy did not perform well in these environments, and 
that the MasterOracle strategy’s earnings decreased rapidly as the dynamicism level was 
increased. Likewise, the EU strategy barely earned a profit when dynamicism was above 
20%.  
It is highly likely that the reason for this relative lack of performance is because of the 
way teams are assembled by the agent. Remember that agent all select desirable teams, 
according to their implemented strategy, from a pool of randomly created teams. Each 
randomly created team is capable of solving the current state of the job (i.e. the current 
active tasks with their current quality of service demands), but other factors – how 
adaptable the team is, how redundant the skills on the team are, how many tasks each 
agent is assigned – are set purely by chance, rather than crafted specifically by the agent 
strategies. This mechanism has the advantages of being an anytime algorithm capable of 
searching very large state spaces (the more potential teams an agent examines, the better 
the team it can ultimately select), and of making it easy to compare different strategies 
(since strategies ultimately only control what jobs and teams the agent selects, and all 
other aspects of agent behavior are the same).  
However, in environments where the skills the agents possess are few in number 
relative to the total number of global task types (which holds true for both Scarce Agent 
Skills and Many Global Skills), the chances that a randomly assembled team will be able 
to cover a significant portion of the tasks that may become active is significantly 
decreased, since the random, unused skills that are crucial to team adaptability, but are 
completely ignored by the team generation mechanism, are largely absent. Accordingly, 
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it seems reasonable to suggest that future work in this area should explore the explicit 
creation of teams by an agent strategy to ensure that excess skills which allow for team 
adaptability (among other beneficial team properties) will be present. 
5.2 Accuracy of Expected Utility‐based strategy 
 
Previous experiments have established that the expected utility-based strategy 
performs well relative to existing heuristic-based strategies, and generally earns within an 
order of magnitude compared to the optimal MasterOracle strategy. However, beyond the 
metric of agent earnings, how well do the individual components of the expected utility-
based strategy perform? More particularly, the expected utility-based strategy is 
composed of three high-level estimates about a job/team combination: what are the 
expected earnings from the job for the EU agent assuming the job is completed, what is 
the likelihood that the job will be successfully completed, and what is the expected 
duration of the job, assuming the job is completed? 
To investigate the accuracy of these estimates, we created instrumentation in the 
expected utility-based strategy that would keep track of the initial estimates agents made 
about job/team combinations, and the ultimate values of the estimated quantities. 
Specifically, after an EU agent selected a job to work on, the EU agent would store the 
expected earnings value, probability of success, and expected duration of the job. Upon 
successfully completing the job, the agent would compare the ultimate earnings and 
duration of the job to the estimate, and store the difference between the two. By 
averaging the difference between the estimate and final value across all completed jobs 
and across all EU agents, we can determine the overall accuracy of these two estimations. 
Likewise, by comparing the average of the estimates of job success to an EU agent’s 
actual success in completing all attempted jobs, we can determine the overall accuracy of 
the EU strategy’s probability of success estimate.  
Accordingly, Figures 23, 24, and 25 show the average difference between the 
estimate and actual values of job earnings, job duration, and probability of success, 
respectively, as taken from the same experimental trials whose parameters where laid out 
 84 
in Table 2, and whose results were shown in Figure 11. Note that because these Figures 
show the difference between the estimated value minus the actual value, a positive value 
in the figure means the estimated value was greater than the final value, and a negative 
value means the estimated value was less than the final value. 
 
 
Figure 23: Average difference in expected utility strategy’s estimated job earnings 



























Figure 24: Average difference in expected utility strategy’s estimated job duration 
and actual job duration 
 
 
Figure 25: Average difference in expected utility strategy’s estimated probability of 





















































The results shown in Figure 23 show that the expected utility-based strategy’s 
estimate of job earnings changes somewhat with the dynamicism of the environment, but 
is roughly within plus or minus 150 credits of the actual value. This would seem to be a 
fairly accurate estimate, given that the average value of a task is approximately 1220 
credits – meaning that, at worst, the average inaccuracy of the EU strategy’s earnings 
estimate is slightly more than 10% of the value of a single task. 
The results shown in Figure 24 indicate that the expected utility-based strategy 
consistently overestimate the duration of an attempted job by roughly 12 timesteps per 
job (although this figure is lower for the 100% dynamicism level) – given that the 
average length of a task is 6 time units, this means that the EU strategy initially 
overestimates the duration of a task by two entire tasks. It is noted that some degree of 
overestimation might be expected from a methodology borrowed from the project 
management domain, where the costs for delivering a project late far outweigh the costs 
of delivering a project early, leading to a strong preference for overly conservative 
estimates. Furthermore, the initial duration estimate is essentially an outlier for job 
duration, since as the job progresses and more tasks become completed or permanently 
inactive, the duration estimate improves and the final estimate approaches the actual 
duration of the job. However, it is likely that further experimentation in this area could 
improve the accuracy of job duration estimations. 
The results shown in Figure 25 show a consistent underestimation of the probability 
that a job will be completed by the EU strategy, with the difference in estimation and 
actuall success varying between 1.5% and 3% over all dynamicism values. From an 
absolute perspective, even a 3% inaccuracy in the probability of completing a job seems 
relatively minor. In addition, it is likely better to be overly pessimistic about the chances 
of completing a job than overly optimistic, since such pessimism will likely keep agents 
from quitting viable teams in order to pursue all but the most outstanding and sure-fire 
opportunities. 
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Furthermore, this “V” shape is understandable, given that a largely static environment 
is easier to predict, as is a 100% dynamic environment, since it is known (or highly 
suspected) that no task instance will actually yield it’s initially apparent payout. In 
contrast, the 40% and 60% dynamicism ranges are more difficult to predict, since the 
chances of a task instance changing or not are nearly even. 
5.3 Performance of Learning Mechanisms 
 
Experimental results presented in previous sections have established that the expected 
utility-based strategy outperforms existing heuristic-based strategies in many 
environments, and is usually within an order of magnitude of strategies such as the 
MasterOracle strategy, which operates with advantages such as advance knowledge of 
task changes and perfectly reliable partner agents.  
However, in these experiments, the EU strategy operated with the advantage of 
knowing the precise dynamicism value, D, of the environment it was embedded in, as 
well as the general reliability of other agents. In real world domains, although it may be 
possible to characterize how likely job requirements are to change and/or how generally 
reliable other agents are, it is possible that such data would not be available to an agent.  
Therefore, in this section, the research assumes that such data is not a priori available. 
Accordingly, agents executing the EU strategy require learning mechanisms to determine 
values such as D and agent reliability from direct observations of the environment. 
Section 4.3 provided the theory on how agents learn such environmental variables, 
specifically showing how the expected utility function could determine the value of D for 
a single observed job, and further describing mechanisms for how such observations 
could be weighted to better determine a changing value of D. 
This section therefore presents the results of experiments designed to show how 
effective these learning mechanisms are, both in terms of how they compare in earnings 
to an expected utility-based strategy with a provided value of D (as opposed to a learned 
value of D) and in how closely they track the actual value of D as it changes in the 
environment. Note that the results of this section focus entirely on how effective the 
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mechanisms for learning the value of D are, since general trust and reputation 
mechanisms for learning the trustworthiness and reliability of other agents are already 
well known (Gujral, DeAngelis et al. 2006; Fullam 2007). 
We begin by comparing the earnings performance of four different EU-derived 
strategies operating in the environment described by Table 2 above. Specifically, the 
standard EU strategy was executed and informed of the set value of D in the 
environment. In contrast, three other versions of the EU strategy were also executed and 
expected to learn the value of D, rather than being directly informed. The Running 
Average strategy kept a straightforward average of all observations, while the Sliding 
Window strategy only averaged those observations of D that had occurred within the past 
100 timesteps, and the Exponential Weighting strategy combined each most recent 
observation of D with the existing average of D depending on how long ago the last 
observation of D was taken, as shown below in Equation 29: 
 
(Eqn. 29):  
 
Figure 26 shows the average earnings of all four classes across a range of values of D 
(the static value, D = 0, was not included), while Figure 27 shows the earnings of the 
three new strategies as a percentage of the Known Dynamicism version of the EU 
strategy – that is, the version of the strategy which was provided with the value of D in 
advance. 
As can be seen from the results below, the earnings for all three learning strategies are 
broadly comparable to the Known Dynamicism strategy, with the Running Average and 
Exponential Weighting strategies being closest to the Known Dynamicism strategy, and 
the Sliding Window strategy being slightly less accurate, for all dynamicism levels. More 
particularly, ANOVA analysis of the data shows that there is no statistically significant 
difference in the earnings of all four strategies at 20% dynamicism, and individual t-tests 
show that there is no significant difference between the Exponential Weighting strategy 
and the Known Dynamicism strategy at any dynamicism level but 40%, and no 
 89 
significant difference between the Running Average strategy and the Known 
Dynamicism strategy at the 60% and 80% levels. 
Figures 28 through 32 allow us to examine these results more closely by showing 
how precisely the three learning strategies tracked the actual dynamicism value (or 
“control” value) over time. More specifically, the “a” part of each figure shows the 
average estimated value of D for all three learning strategies across the lifetime of the 
experimental trials, while the “b” part of each figure shows the average difference 























Figure 27: Average total earnings for EU learning strategies as a percentage of 


















Figure 28a-b: EU learning strategies average estimation of 20% control 




































































































Figure 29a-b: EU learning strategies average estimation of 40% control 




































































































Figure 30a-b: EU learning strategies average estimation of 60% control 





































































































Figure 31a-b: EU learning strategies average estimation of 80% control 





































































































Figure 32a-b: EU learning strategies average estimation of 100% control 
dynamicism level and average estimation error 
 
As can be seen from Figures 28 through 32 above, the Running Average and 
Exponential Weighting mechanisms performed well, usually converging to within plus or 
minus ten percent of the actual value of D within roughly 100 timesteps. Interestingly, 
both strategies tended to overestimate the value of D when D was at 20% and 40% of 































































































underestimate D when D was at 100%, as seen in Figure 32. However, as shown in 
Figures 26 and 27, these discrepancies did not have a highly substantial effect on the 
earnings of each strategy, and could probably be further addressed through further 
refinement of Equations 25 through 28 in Chapter 4. 
In contrast, the Sliding Window strategy performed poorly, almost always converging 
to an estimated value of D of roughly 40% tasks changed during the lifetime of the job, 
regardless of the actual value of D. This is likely because the value in the figures above is 
the average value of hundreds of Sliding Window agents over ten different trials, whereas 
each individual Sliding Window agent at a particular instant in time would likely have 
had a wildly different idea of what D was, ranging all over the spectrum, as shown by the 
relatively high error estimates in the “b” figures. (Note that, as can be seen from the 
Running Average and Exponential Weighting results, even with an actual value of D at 
100% in Figure 32, the agents do not generally make estimates of more than 90%. Thus, 
an average estimate error of around 40% implies that many agents could have seen, for 
example, an 80% actual value of D as being anything from 90% to 0% - this would still 
have resulted in an average estimation of roughly 40%, and an average error of roughly 
40% from the true value of D.) 
One possible explanation for this lack of performance is that the window size of the 
Sliding Window algorithm is too small – that it leaves the strategy with too few samples 
to make an accurate estimate. However, given that this window already represents 10% 
of the experiment’s lifetime, and given that both the Running Average and Exponential 
Weighting strategies converge on the value of D within 100 timesteps, it seems more 
reasonable to conclude that, in this domain, completely abandoning all prior observations 
of D taken before an arbitrary point is a poor strategy, and that these observations should 
be, at most, slightly discounted (as by the Exponential Weighting strategy) rather than 
completely abandoned. 
Figure 33 shows another comparison of an EU strategy with Known Dynamicism to 
the three EU-based learning strategies, in this case with each job in the experiment set to 
a different value of D randomly assigned from a level distribution between 0% and 
100%. However, as can be seen from Figure 33, all strategies performed roughly the 
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same, as confirmed by ANOVA analysis, which finds that there is no statistically 




Figure 33: Average total earnings for EU learning strategies and EU with known 
dynamicism under random conditions 
 
Lastly, Figure 34 shows a final comparison of an EU strategy with Known 
Dynamicism to the three EU-based learning strategies. Here, the control value of D was 
abruptly stepped twice during the experimental trials, starting at 25%, jumping to roughly 
65% one-third of the way through the trials, then jumping back to roughly 35% two-
thirds of the way through the trials. Figure 35 shows the evolution of D throughout the 
experiment, as well as the estimate of D for all three learning strategies. 
As can be seen from the figures below, the earnings of the Known Dynamicism and 
Exponential Weighting strategies are essentially the same, while the earnings of the other 
two strategies are lower. In fact, ANOVA analysis indicates that there is a significant 
difference between the four strategies, but a t-test of the Known Dynamicism and 
Exponential Weighting strategies finds no significant difference between the two. 
This observation is confirmed by the way that the Exponential Weighting strategy 
























and slowly moving to a close approximation of the control. In contrast, although the 
Running Average estimation does change the first time D changes, by the second time 
there are too many obsolete historical observations to be overcome, and the estimation of 
D remains constant. Likewise, the Sliding Window strategy shows some small 
movements as D changes, but generally hones in on the roughly 40% estimation level 
seen in previous experiments. 
Therefore, based on these results, it is apparent that the Exponential Weighting 
strategy performs best of the explored alternatives, to a point where it is statistically 





Figure 34: Average total earnings for EU learning strategies and EU with known 














































































The experimental results laid out above in Chapter 5 have shown that an expected 
utility-based strategy can successfully form robust teams in a generic dynamic and 
contractless environment. However, as Research Question 5 states, “Can agents acting in 
accordance with the utility theory found in RQ2 be usefully deployed in a real world-
based consulting domain?” More specifically, how does the EU strategy developed in this 
dissertation compare to existing team- and job-selection strategies prevalent in the real 
world consulting domain? 
This chapter compares the performance of the expected utility-based strategy 
examined above to a “Manager” strategy embedded in a simulated consulting domain. 
More particularly, we wish to compare the performance of agents executing the expected 
utility-based strategy, either as a homogenous group or as part of a heterogeneous mix of 
agent strategies, against an agent strategy that enjoys many of the advantages that a 
manager at a large consulting company might enjoy – i.e. the ability to ensure that agents 
do not defect from an assigned task, and the ability to select agents that are currently idle, 
rather than having to recruit agents who may be otherwise engaged. In comparison, an 
agent executing an expected utility-based strategy is expected to be better able to predict 
and handle task instance changes and team member defections, and to have lower 
overhead compared to a centralized managerial organization.  
Section 6.1 of this chapter provides an overview of the consulting domain, and 
compares and contrasts various aspects of the consulting domain with existing features of 
the simulation domain previously described in Chapter 4. Section 6.2 describes the 
Manager strategy and other aspects of the consulting domain simulation experiments, 
while section 6.3 provides the results of those experiments, as well as analysis of the 






Consultants are a broad class of domain experts and/or service providers who assist 
businesses and organizations with queries and tasks that are outside of their core 
capabilities. Consulting firms such as Accenture or IBM Global Technology Services are 
capable of assembling teams of experts in various fields to assist with various challenges 
a business might be facing, such as refining or reorganizing business processes, or 
implementing technological solutions to improve business efficiency (Hamm 2008; 
Accenture 2009). In addition, individual experts and service providers may act as 
freelance consultants, either as their primary career or as a supplement to their primary 
job (e.g. a university professor acting as a consultant in areas related to their primary area 
of research.) Consulting is a large and very lucrative industry; Kennedy Information Inc. 
estimated global consulting industry revenues were estimated to be 310 billion U.S. 
dollars for the year 2007 (Plunkett 2008). 
Such freelance consultants essentially find work on an ad hoc basis, scheduling jobs 
as opportunity arises via informal communication networks. In contrast, the corporate 
consulting world has recently begun to make great advances in modeling worker skills, 
characteristics, and availability to allow for more efficient assembly of consultant teams 
to tackle different problems. For example, IBM has embarked on a project to model the 
expertise of its technical consultants to determine how best to deploy them on disparate 
projects (Baker 2008). Via internal software called IBM Professional Marketplace, 
project managers can find candidates who meet the required qualifications for a job, 
including characteristics such as technical or business skills, work visa status, 
availability, worker cost, organizational alignment, or job role. In IBM’s case, this 
information is input into the system by integration of various databases, including human 
resources information, management chain information, and resume data (Heise 2009). 
In addition, other companies are capable of mining similar information from other 
sources. For example, Microsoft’s SharePoint Server is capable of mining email 
distribution lists and other social networking features to determine organizational 
attributes, while the Semantic Web is a broadly applicable metadata technology capable 
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of identifying vast amounts of information available via both internal networks and the 
World Wide Web (Berners-Lee, Hendler et al. 2001; DeBruyne 2009). Furthermore, 
these expertise identification technologies can, in some cases, be linked with 
sophisticated project management software such as Microsoft Project Server (Microsoft 
2009), or can be used in conjunction with software development and modeling software 
such as IBM’s Rational suite (IBM 2009). 
Although these technologies are currently primarily employed by large, centralized 
consulting firms, it should be possible to duplicate many of the advantages these 
technologies bring – expertise identification on a global scale, professional-grade project 
modeling capabilities – to the wider world via open source technologies, much like open 
source projects such as Open Office have largely duplicated software packages such as 
Microsoft Office.  
With such tools, freelance consultants would be able to identify and schedule work on 
jobs and with partners in the same way that centralized consulting firms do. The primary 
difficulties would be in getting agents to work together with potentially untrustworthy 
agents in an open environment such as the Internet, and building teams capable of 
adapting to the uncertainty and dynamicism inherent in a complex project. Dealing with 
these issues is, of course, the primary aim of this dissertation. 
However, even given the importance of the consulting domain, the question still 
remains whether the consulting domain is a good match for the robust team formation 
strategies presented herein. To answer this question, we compare the two domains from 
two different perspectives below. First, we begin by listing characteristics of team 
formation between selfish agents operating in a dynamic, contractless environment, and 
ask whether these characteristics are commonly found in the consulting domain. Next, we 
list various characteristics of the consulting domain, and determine whether these 
characteristics can be integrated into the team formation simulation environment 




The first, most obvious aspects of the robust team formation environment described 
above in Chapter 3 are the multiple selfish agents attempting to complete multiple jobs. 
It is immediately apparent that the consulting domain possesses both of these 
characteristics – there are clearly numerous freelance consultants with many different 
areas of expertise in the world, and many consulting groups, both large and small, with 
numerous individual consultants at both the associate and partner levels. These 
consultants work on a wide variety of projects, either with the goal of maximizing profit 
for themselves or improving their position within a firm. Accordingly, it is reasonable to 
argue that the consulting domain features selfish agents working on different jobs for 
profit. 
In addition, consultants collaborating via the Internet must frequently deal with the 
contractless environments found in the simulation environment, for multiple reasons. 
First, any collaboration via the Internet faces the threat of anonymity or fake identities – 
it is nearly impossible to enforce a contract when the identity of one or multiple parties is 
unknown or unreliable (Yokoo, Conitzer et al. 2005). Second, even when the identity of 
both parties is known, questions of jurisdiction arise. It is possible that the collaborating 
parties are in entirely different countries, in which case there may be no controlling legal 
authority capable of enforcing any contractual agreement, especially when one of the 
parties purposefully tries to break the contract. Finally, even when the identity of both 
parties is known, and both are in a common legal jurisdiction, it is arguable that the 
expense and effort involved with drafting and enforcing contracts largely negates many 
advantages – such as speed, ease, and cost – associated with collaborating via the 
Internet.  
It is also worth noting that even consultants working together in a firm or corporation, 
where verified identities and legal jurisdiction are clearly not issues, may face some of 
the issues involved with failure of consultants to live up to stated obligation. More 
specifically, even employees at a firm may suddenly quit, fall ill, or otherwise be 
incapable of providing an expected skill or service. Such difficulties are clearly less than 
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those faced by online collaborators, but they do suggest that the research discussed in this 
dissertation may have some degree of applicability even beyond online collaborators. 
Almost by definition, any job that requires a team of workers to complete it is 
composed of multiple tasks, frequently because different individuals with distinct and 
specialized skills are required to complete different aspects of the job. Certainly the 
consulting domain fits these criteria, since consultants are, again almost by definition, 
providers of specialized skills and expertise hired for the specific purpose of solving an 
uncommon problem that a business or other organization is not suited to handle. The 
simulation environment described in this dissertation clearly also captures this aspect of 
the consulting domain, not only with respect to technical or professional skills such as 
coding or business analysis, but with respect to secondary skills and characteristics as 
well, such as the ability to speak a specific language, geographic location and legal right 
to work in a specific country. 
Our simulation environment and expected utility-based strategy also model dynamic 
environments, environments where the requirements to complete a job change in an 
unpredictable manner over time. The consultancy domain might face such discrepancies 
between the initial requirements for a job and the final requirements for a job because of 
several reasons. First, jobs can be inherently dynamic, with external circumstances 
forcing requirements changes at any time in the project development (Jalote 2001). 
Alternatively, jobs requirements may not change over time so much as be initially 
misunderstood, either due to incomplete information, bounded rationality or inexperience 
on the part of the requirements modelers. These changes to requirements are arguably not 
so much aspects of real environmental dynamicism so much as inaccurate perceptions of 
job requirements, but regardless, the strategies described above for providing adaptable 
teams that can handle unexpected job requirements are workable solutions. 
Finally, the paramount decisions in the simulation environment described above are 
what jobs should an agent work on, and what agents should be partnered with? 
These considerations are particularly important for freelance consultants who face an 
open marketplace full of opportunities to pursue, and who must judiciously determine 
which opportunities are likely to be most profitable, and what teams are most likely to be 
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able to complete a job. Again, the work presented here is ideally suited for allowing these 
consultants to determine what jobs to pursue and what partners to work with in order to 
maximize profit. 
6.1.2 Characteristics of consulting domain 
Once we have determined that various aspects of the simulation environment 
described in Chapter 3 are relevant to the consulting domain, we must ask whether 
various aspects of the consulting domain can be modeled by the simulation environment. 
Section 6.1.1 has already addressed some characteristics of the consulting domain, such 
as agents with different skills of various kinds – technical, professional, interpersonal – 
and also different qualifications and attributes, such as geographic location, or permits or 
visas to work in different countries. All of these characteristics can easily be modeled by 
the simulation environment by making these skills and characteristics individual tasks 
(e.g. a Java coder is a type of task, and the ability to speak Spanish is a different type of 
task, both of which are initially active) or by making combinations of these skills and 
characteristics an individual task (e.g. a Spanish-speaking Java coder is a single task, and 
is distinct from a French-speaking Java coder, or a Spanish-speaking C coder). 
In addition to having consultants with different skills, the real-world consulting 
domain features different competencies of the same type of skill. For example, while 
there are many C++ coders in the world, some are beginners, some have a moderate level 
of expertise, and some are true experts. It is also the case that jobs and tasks require 
different skill levels – the same basic task of writing Java code, for example, can be 
relatively simple (a small utility application), somewhat difficult (writing application 
code as part of a team) or very difficult (architecting a distributed application). These 
difficulties can, in general, be matched to different skill levels, so that experts do difficult 
tasks and beginners do simple tasks. Furthermore, while someone of a higher skill level is 
generally able to accomplish the same work as someone of a lower skill level, the reverse 
is not necessarily true.  
In the simulation environment, this is mirrored by the concept of quality-of-service 
levels in tasks and agent skill levels, where different agents have the ability to solve some 
 106 
tasks, but not others, of the same type. Furthermore, just as expert consultants can 
frequently command a much higher fee than junior consultants, there is a substantial 
difference in the earnings that an agent completing a task with a high quality-of-service 
demand can expect, relative to an agent completing a low quality-of-service demand. 
In addition to quality-of-service differences in task rewards, different types of tasks 
are inherently more profitable than others. In the software business domain, for 
example, it is the case that administrative assistants, accountants, and coders are all 
needed to make a working software company, but because of various factors, working on 
coding tasks is inherently more profitable than working on accounting or administrative 
tasks. Likewise, our simulation has a value multiplier associated with each type of task, 
in addition to making longer tasks (e.g. tasks requiring more effort) worth more than 
shorter tasks. The simulation environment is therefore able to capture a great deal of 
variability in the expected payoff for tasks, from the expensive (e.g. a long tasks with a 
high task value multiplier and a high degree of difficulty) to the inexpensive (e.g. a short 
task with a low value multiplier and a low degree of difficulty). Accordingly, although 
the simulation does not directly model the explicit fees that a consultant can demand (e.g. 
an experienced lawyer might ask for several hundred dollars an hour to work as a 
consultant), more skilled agents can effectively demand a higher reward from the market 
by electing to work on jobs where they are assigned more profitable tasks. 
An additional characteristic of the consulting domain is that different consultants 
are available at different times – when a consultant is working on a given project, his or 
her ability to take on new work will be at the very least, diminished, if not outright 
eliminated. For the purposes of experimentation, we assume that agents can only work on 
one project at a time, although it would certainly be possible to modify the simulation to 
behave otherwise. In addition, our previous experiments have made the assumption that 
agents must communicate via message to determine availability and interest between 
foremen and worker agents – this is arguably a worthwhile assumption when 
communicating between agents on the Internet, who may be able to communicate 
instantaneously but may also take additional time to consider one or more offers to join a 
team before replying. In contrast, consultants who work for a large organization may 
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have their availability made far more explicit to other partners via a centralized 
scheduling system (Microsoft 2006). Accordingly, as will be described in further detail in 
section 6.2, we have adapted our experiments in part to remove the blind guessing about 
agent availability seen in previous experiments. 
Lastly, it is the case that complex, multi-task jobs are often characterized by 
uncertainty as to the duration of both the project as a whole, and of individual 
subtasks (Shtub, Bard et al. 2005). However, our simulation work, while certainly 
allowing for uncertainty in the total duration of entire jobs due to changing task 
requirements and changing team membership, does not allow for tasks to be of variable 
duration. This is largely because other work has already explored how to deal with 
uncertainty in task duration (Ahn, DeAngelis et al. 2007; Stein, Payne et al. 2007), and 
determining how to integrate the robust team formation strategies described here with 




To better test the expected utility-based strategy in real world conditions, we compare 
the previously described EU strategies to a new Manager strategy, which is designed to 
more closely approximate the arrangement of real world consulting firms. More 
specifically, the Manager strategy acts the same way a project manager in a centralized 
consulting firm does, in that it is responsible for selecting a job and assembling a team of 
agents to work on the job, but does not actually work on any of the component subtasks 
of the job itself.  
The Manager strategy in these experiments also has many of the advantages that a 
manager in a centralized firm does, in that it not only commands the loyalty of agents 
(i.e. agents cannot quit working for it until they have finished their assigned tasks), but 
that it knows the availability of potential partners, and will not waste time trying to 
recruit potential partners who are otherwise engaged. Additionally, the Manager strategy 
will never take the initiative to look for a more profitable job while it is already working 
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on a job, but will always look for a new job to work on when it is idle, rather than waiting 
for an offer from another agent. 
(Note that, in comparison, all other strategies, including the MasterOracle strategy, do 
not know if the offers it makes to potential partners are being directed towards agents 
who are already working on a job, and will, at random times, look for other jobs to work 
on as a foreman, even if it is already occupied.) 
The Manager strategy is experimentally compared to the EU strategy in two different 
contexts. In the first, the EU strategy is part of a mixed group of agents, with all other 
agents following the heuristic strategies described above in Chapter 3. In the second 
context, all agents in the experiment follow the EU strategy. All experiments are carried 




Figure 35 shows the average per-agent earnings for all agents in the Manager 
experimental trials, as compared to the average total earnings for agents following the EU 
strategy in the two alternate contexts. Figure 36 provides an alternate view of the same 
data by showing average EU earnings as a percentage of the average earnings for each 




Figure 36: Average per-agent earnings for all agents under Manager strategy vs. 
average EU earnings 
 
 
Figure 37: Average EU earnings as a percentage of average per-agent earnings 
under Manager strategy 
 
As can be seen from the graph, both of the EU strategies significantly outperform the 

























levels. This result strongly suggests that workers can earn more profit when they are 
allowed to pursue now opportunities as they arise, rather than being locked into a 
particular job until finished. The EU strategy which deals with a heterogeneous mix of 
unreliable partners still performs better than the Manager strategy, even in purely static 
environments, suggesting that the EU strategy’s ability to handle changing job 
requirements is not the primary advantage it has over the Manager strategy.  
Instead it seems likely that the EU strategy has an advantage in that each agent pushes 
for the most profitable job for itself, whereas the manager agent is only interested in 
maximizing total revenues and there is no mechanism for an agent to find its maximally 
profitable job. Rather, the Manager assigns agents more or less randomly to any task they 
can handle. This also explains the even higher profit in environments where all agents are 
using the EU strategy, since every agent seeks out (or takes new offers to work on) new 
jobs that better suit its abilities, rather than sticking with an assigned task. 
Figure 38 through 40 offer supporting evidence for this argument. Figure 38 shows 
the total jobs completed by all agents in each experimental setting, whereas Figure 39 
shows the total profit earned by all agents combined in each setting (unlike Figure 36, 
which shows the average profit per agent). Figure 40 shows the average worker profits 
per class of agent working under the Manager strategy, and is accompanied by a reprint 











































Figure 40: Worker earnings for agents under Manager strategy 
 
 





































Specifically, Figures 38 and 39 are noteworthy because they show that the number of 
jobs completed and global profit earned is actually higher for the Manager strategy than 
for the EU strategy with mixed partners. (Note that these graphs are roughly identical, 
and total earnings generated for all agents is directly correlated with the total number of 
jobs completed by all agents.) EU agents earn far more than agents under the Manager 
strategy even though fewer jobs are completed; EU agents therefore have a higher profit 
per complete job. This is further proven by Figures 40 and 12b – note that individual 
worker profit is far higher and better distributed under the Manager strategy, whereas 
under the EU strategy, EU foremen choose jobs that most benefit them as individuals, 
rather than the group as a whole. 
Figures 38 and 39 also give some indication as to why the Manager model is so 
widespread in real world domains. Note that, from a broad standpoint, the Manager 
model is actually a more productive model than an EU strategy operating with other 
mixed strategies. This is important for two reasons: first, because the Manager model 
actually does a better job at maximizing the productivity of an entire group, and second 
because the Manager model is actually better at completing more jobs, even if it is not as 
good as the EU agent at determining the profitability of each job.  
This dissertation has largely ignored the beneficial effects of repeated interactions 
between satisfied buyers and sellers, and it is reasonable to argue that in an online, 
largely anonymous environment populated by increasingly transient virtual organizations, 
customer loyalty will be less important, or outright impossible to maintain. However, in 
the traditional business settings where relationships and repeat business are very 
important, it certainly has been important to keep satisfied clients, which explains the 
Manager strategy’s traditional popularity. 
Note also that experimental trials where all agents use the EU strategy were far more 
profitable and successful than other strategy pairings. However, this kind of setup would 
have been virtually impossible to set up in the past, when individual workers could not be 
reasonably expected to do their jobs and the in-depth calculations required to execute the 
EU strategy for job and team selection. Even today, when it is possible to imagine large 
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groups of freelance consultants each choosing jobs and partners based on the 
recommendation of a personal scheduling agent running the EU strategy, it is possible 
that there may be as yet unidentified incentives that would push individual freelancers to 
defect from a universally-followed EU strategy. It is therefore unclear whether a 
universal EU strategy is feasible from a game theoretic standpoint, and more research 
into this area is likely warranted.  
Regardless, however, it remains the case that the EU strategy has proved more 
profitable than the traditional manager strategy. Note also that, although the manager 
strategy completes more jobs than the EU strategy in environments with a mix of agent 
strategies, the manager strategy does so only because it can command other agents to be 
completely reliable. In the open environments such as the Internet, where agents interact 
anonymously with no controlling authority available, the Manager strategy could not 





This dissertation focused on robust coalition formation between selfish agents in a 
dynamic environment where contracts are unenforceable. Such environments are found in 
numerous domains, one in particular being freelance consultants collaborating over the 
Internet. 
Previous agent research has covered different aspects of the problem of selfish agents 
operating in dynamic, contractless environments, but no research successfully addresses 
all of these aspects – selfish agents, dynamic and contractless environments -  in 
combination. For example, although algorithms exist that are capable of efficiently 
partitioning selfish agents into teams assigned to given jobs in a static environment 
(Kraus, Shehory et al. 2003), such algorithms are inadequate to address the exponential 
number of potential job permutations in a dynamic environment. Likewise, although 
mechanisms exist for allowing teams to adapt to dynamic job requirements (Scerri, 
Farinelli et al. 2005), such teams are composed of selfless agents, and are not applicable 
to selfish agents which may not accept a loss of utility as tasks change. Finally, although 
contracting mechanisms exist that are capable of allowing selfish agents to deal with 
uncertain information or dynamic environments (Sandholm and Lesser 1996), such 
mechanisms are clearly not applicable to domains such as the Internet where contracts 
cannot be enforced. Therefore, because no research currently covers all aspects of 
coalition formation between selfish agents in a dynamic, contractless environment, a 
novel approach is required.  
The main hypothesis of this dissertation is that, in a contractless, dynamic 
environment, peer groups of autonomous agents can form high-utility teams by forming 
robust teams that balance skill set adaptability and redundancy with individual agent 
incentive. Accordingly, this dissertation accordingly has three major goals: to develop a 
theoretical framework that describes how selfish agents should select jobs and partners in 
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a dynamic, contractless environment, to test that framework against existing heuristics in 
a simulated environment, and to create a learning agent capable of optimally adjusting its 
coalition formation strategy based environmental factors. 
The dissertation successfully addressed each goal. First, an expected utility-based 
strategy was developed based on a function that allowed different job/team combinations 
to be compared for expected profit. This EU strategy was described in theoretical terms, 
and placed inside a simulated environment for comparison against both pre-existing 
heuristic-based strategies and the newly developed Master, Oracle, and MasterOracle 
“ideal” strategies. These ideal strategies do not operate under the same unpredictably 
dynamic and contractless constraints as the heuristic and EU strategies, and accordingly 
provide a theoretical baseline for maximum earnings. The EU strategy was found to 
perform significantly better than pre-existing heuristic-based strategies, and was roughly 
within one order of magnitude of the ideal strategies in terms of average agent earnings 
per strategy.  
More specifically, agents following the Expected Utility strategy earned at least one 
fifth the credit of agents following the “Oracle” strategy, which allowed agents to see into 
the future, which strongly suggests that the EU strategy does a reasonably good job of 
estimating the true value of a job in a dynamic environment. The EU strategy also 
compared well to the “Master” strategy, which prohibited partner agents from defecting. 
In highly dynamic environments, the EU strategy even outperformed the Master strategy, 
which strongly suggest that the risk of building teams of defection-prone agent can be 
offset by creating flexible teams that can deal with both defections and changes in job 
requirements. The EU strategy is also found to work well under different environmental 
conditions where agent skills are plentiful, or jobs are scarce, but that none of the 
presented strategies, including the “MasterOracle” strategy performed well when the 
number of skills required to successfully complete a job was high compared to the 
number of agents available. Further testing also indicated that the EU strategy is able to 
accurately estimate the earnings from a given job and the probability of success for a 
given job, but that further refinements on the EU strategy’s estimation of a job’s length 
may be useful. 
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Learning mechanisms were also developed which allowed the EU strategy to detect 
the current dynamicism value of the environment, rather than being given the precise 
value in advance. A learning mechanism using exponential weighting of observations 
was found to be highly effective, and statistically indistinguishable from an EU agent 
operating with a precise, known value of dynamicism. The learning mechanism was also 
able to quickly track changes in the level of dynamicism found in the environment (i.e., 
how much of a job’s requirements changed during the lifetime of a job) and to adjust 
agent strategy accordingly. 
This research also considered the real world domain of the consulting industry  
analyzing the similarities and differences between the consulting domain and the existing 
simulation environment developed for prior work. Based on this analysis, changes were 
made to both the simulation environment and the theory underlying that environment to 
allow for new factors to be considered, such as task quality of service and precedence 
between tasks in a job. Furthermore, the EU strategy was tested against a “Manager” 
strategy designed to mimic the internal workings of a large, centralized consulting firm. 
The EU strategy was found to be more successful at earning profit than agents working 
under the Manager strategy, both when working with other, heterogeneous strategies and 
in a homogenous, EU-only group of agents.  
These results strongly imply that the EU strategy would be highly valuable operating 
in real-world environments where job requirements can be expected to change 
significantly over the lifetime of a job, and where contracts between humans and/or 
agents cannot be enforced, such as freelance consulting on the Internet. Furthermore, by 
providing a strategy which is capable of dealing with selfish agents in dynamic, 
contractless environments, this dissertation fills a previously unexplored area of agent 








The EU strategy has been proven capable of forming high-utility teams in dynamic, 
contractless, environments, and of significantly outperforming existing heuristic-based 
strategies.  The EU strategy is based on an environmental domain assumed to have 
certain properties:  
 
• Agents are not limited by knowledge about prospective jobs, partners, 
requirements and skills. This is believed to be a feasible assumption, based 
on the current power and potential reach of modern search technology and the 
Semantic Web. 
• Agents earn profit directly proportional to the tasks they complete. This is 
partially because negotiated profit sharing lies beyond the scope of this 
research, and partially because enforcing division of profit sharing implies 
enforcing profit sharing agreements, which runs counter to the basic idea of a 
contactless environment. 
• Agents not working on an assigned task are assumed to have defected. 
This is a simplifying assumption based on the clear need for abandoned tasks 
to be quickly reassigned to another team member – note that determining 
whether a teammate who works only “part time” on a given task has actually 
quit, or is simply working on a different team is far more complex than simply 
noting that a teammate has not performed its required action. However, future 
work could address this issue by specifying that agents must spend an agreed-
upon percentage of time working on a specific team, and altering the EU 
calculations accordingly. 
• There is a direct 1-to-1 mapping between skills and tasks. This is again a 
simplifying assumption that makes it easier to determine what tasks are 
covered and what are not. However, future work could likewise address this 
assumption by defining a task as a complex demand for multiple agents to 
simultaneously use a given skill to complete the task, rather than simple 1-to-1 
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mapping of tasks and skills. This, in turn, would likely necessitate further 
changes to the core EU algorithm. 
• The supply of workers and skills is fixed per simulation. Furthermore, 
because the price structure of agent rewards for completing certain types of 
tasks is fixed and randomly generated in a manner independent of the actual 
distribution of tasks and skills, this dissertation does not address any supply-
and-demand type questions that might show how the supply of workers and 
skills might change over time due to price signals. This is likewise work that 
might be addressed in the future. 
 
In addition, further modifications to the EU strategy itself are possible, both to handle 
new environmental features (e.g. more precise information on the likelihood that specific 
tasks will change, or that specific agents will defect) and to further refine existing 
features (e.g. improving the accuracy of estimating D). In addition this work could be 
integrated with general trust and reputation algorithms by allowing the EU strategy to act 
as an interim strategy during the “bootstrap” period of reputation learning. More 
precisely, the EU strategy could operate with starting estimate for general agent 
reliability during periods where existing trust and reputation algorithms are still 
determining the reliability of individual agents, and gradually be phased out or integrated 
with other trust and reputation strategies as reliability information becomes more certain.   
Additional work could also be done on adapting the EU strategy from an “anytime” 
algorithm that simply selects increasingly superior job/team combinations when faced 
with a random stream of potential opportunities, to a strategy that actively shapes an 
active search for the optimal job/team parings in an environment. This would allow the 
EU strategy to better compete in environments where there are a high number of skills 
required for a job, compared to the number of agents available to partner with. Lastly, the 
game theoretic aspects of agents choosing an EU strategy vs. other strategies in a mixed 
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